Who Needs \u3ci\u3eChevron\u3c/i\u3e? Pfizer, the Anti-Inversion Regulations, and the Anti-Injunction Act by Melone, Matthew A.
MELONE_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017 2:51 PM 
 
927 
WHO NEEDS CHEVRON?  PFIZER, THE 
ANTI-INVERSION REGULATIONS, AND 
THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT 
Matthew A. Melone 
The remedy for wrongs is to forget them. 
-Publilius Syrus** 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 927 
I.  ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT .................................................... 929 
A. Tax or Penalty ................................................................. 932 
B. Purpose of Suit ............................................................... 936 
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND TAX 
EXCEPTIONALISM ............................................................. 939 
A. Deference: A Crack in the Armor of Tax 
Exceptionalism ............................................................... 944 
B. The State Farm Doctrine................................................. 951 
III.  PFIZER-ALLERGAN MERGER AND THE ANTI- 
INVERSION REGULATIONS ............................................. 963 
A. Background ..................................................................... 963 
B. Application of the Anti-Injunction Act........................... 968 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 977 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015 Pfizer, Inc., agreed to merge with Allergan—an Irish 
corporation—in a transaction that would have resulted in a corporate group 
with an Irish parent.  This type of transaction, a so-called inversion, has been 
the subject of much media attention.  Depending on one’s political and 
economic preferences, these transactions are either evidence of tax dodging 
 
 J.D., C.P.A., Professor of Law, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA. 
** Andy Zubco, Treasury of Spiritual Wisdom: A Collection of 10,0000 Inspirational 
Quotations, 170 (3d ed. 1998) (quoting Publilius Syrus).  
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by unpatriotic corporations, or a rational response to an unduly burdensome 
U.S. corporate tax system.  The Treasury Department issued regulations that 
eliminated the planned tax benefits of the Pfizer deal and similarly-situated 
inversions.  The regulations are controversial and, allegedly exceed the 
Treasury’s authority.  We may never know whether these regulations are a 
proper exercise of agency authority.  Pfizer did not challenge the regulations; 
instead, the transaction suffered an ignominious denouement—it was 
scuttled. 
Pfizer had good reason to forgo a legal challenge.  The Anti-Injunction 
Act, a century-and-a-half-year-old statute, precludes pre-enforcement 
challenges to tax rules.  In virtually all cases, payment of the tax in dispute 
and a subsequent suit for refund is an adequate remedy for taxpayers.  
However, in unusual circumstances, a post-enforcement challenge is neither 
practical nor realistic.  The anti-inversion regulations create unusual 
circumstances, leading Pfizer to walk away from its deal with Allergan 
without a fight. 
Part I of this Article provides a detailed analysis of the Anti-Injunction 
Act and its scope, as refined by a number of court decisions.  The statute 
emphasizes the importance of the government’s revenue collection function 
and the result of its application can be quite harsh.  Taxpayer attempts to skirt 
the statute, whether by assertions that the challenged exaction is not a tax or 
by assertions that the purpose of the suit has nothing to do with revenue 
collection, have been largely unsuccessful.  The Supreme Court, in its 
landmark case upholding the constitutionality of the individual health 
insurance mandate imposed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, clarified the statute’s application in certain respects. 
Part II of this Article examines the special treatment often afforded the 
Treasury in its tax administration role.  The Anti-Injunction Act is but one 
example of tax exceptionalism.  The Treasury enjoys advantages granted by 
Congress, but it also has appropriated advantages for itself.  Its casual 
relationship with the Administrative Procedure Act is well known.  For 
decades, however, the notion that tax rules were somehow different from 
other rules resulted in less judicial deference to certain Treasury regulations.  
In what was, at the time, considered a major win for the Treasury, a 2011 
Supreme Court decision rejected tax exceptionalism and held that Treasury 
regulations are entitled to the same deference enjoyed by other agencies.  The 
cost of this victory has been the application of general administrative law 
principles to tax regulations, a previously foreign concept to the tax world.  
In certain cases, administrative failures can render tax regulations invalid on 
their face.  An open question is whether such a failure opens the door for a 
pre-enforcement taxpayer challenge. 
 Part III of this Article discusses the Pfizer-Allergan transaction and 
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the anti-inversion regulations that sounded its death knell.  This part also 
examines the judicially-created exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act and 
asserts that the existing exceptions are of little utility because they are either 
inapplicable or are of little practical utility to a taxpayer contemplating a 
transaction of the magnitude of the Pfizer deal.  This part concludes with the 
argument that the courts should apply the existing exceptions to the statute 
in a more nuanced and equitable manner.  The effect of the anti-inversion 
regulations on taxpayers is unusual and the courts should react accordingly.  
There is something unseemly about a legal system which leaves a taxpayer 
with no practical alternative to capitulating to tax rules that it believes are 
unlawful.  The importance of the revenue raising function is not in dispute, 
but that importance should not blind the courts to basic principles of equity.  
The ever-increasing use of the tax code as an instrument of social policy, as 
opposed to government funding, should give impetus to the courts to be less 
reflexive in their application of the statute. 
I.   ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT 
I.R.C. section 7421, the Anti-Injunction Act, prohibits any “suit for the 
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax . . . in any court 
by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such 
tax was assessed.”
1
  Similarly prohibited are suits for the purposes of 
restraining the assessment or collection of the liability of a transferee of 
property of a taxpayer with respect to any internal revenue tax or the amount 
of the liability of a fiduciary for unpaid taxes.
2
  The statute’s requirement 
that taxpayers resolve their tax disputes in a suit for refund, a principle that 
has been in effect in some statutory form since 1867, is an unremarkable 
admonition to taxpayers that they must exhaust administrative remedies 
before proceeding to court.
3
  The Anti-Injunction Act provides legislative 
 
 1. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).  
 2. I.R.C. § 7421(b). 
 3. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 168, 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475 (1867).  The 1867 legislation 
amended an 1866 statute that precluded suits for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been 
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected before an appeal was duly made to the 
commissioner.  See Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 191-92 (1883) (discussing the changes 
made by the 1867 amendment to the 1866 act).  There is no recorded legislative history of the 
1867 statute.  Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974); see also Erin Morrow 
Hawley, The Equitable Anti-Injunction Act, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 81, 95-98 (2014) (noting 
that the legislative history of the Anti-Injunction Act is not recorded, but there are some 
indicators of congressional motive).  In order to file a refund suit, a taxpayer must first file a 
claim for refund with the I.R.S.  I.R.C. § 7422(a).  Full payment of the assessed tax is required 
in order to bring a suit for refund.  See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960) (interpreting 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2012) to mean the district courts and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
have concurrent jurisdiction in any civil action against the United States for the recovery of 
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notice of the “[g]overnment’s need to assess and collect taxes as 
expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial 
interference.”
4
 
Taxpayers do have a mechanism to challenge I.R.S. action prior to 
enforcement—the United States Tax Court—but that mechanism is rather 
limited and is, almost always, a pre-assessment mechanism.
5
  If the I.R.S. 
 
any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, and finding that 
the statutory language does not limit such suits to the person against whom the tax was 
assessed).  The Court has also held that a non-assessed party that had paid a tax to remove a 
federal tax lien from her property had standing to bring a refund suit.  United States v. 
Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995). 
 4. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004) (quoting Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 736).  Hibbs 
involved another statute, the Tax Injunction Act, which precludes federal court interference 
with the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where an efficient remedy 
is available through the state’s courts.  28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).  The Court has interpreted 
this statute similarly to the Anti-Injunction Act.  See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 
1124, 1129 (2015) (suggesting the language of the Tax Injunction Act was modeled after the 
Anti-Injunction Act and assuming the language used in both Acts are used the same way).  
Whether an exaction is a tax for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act, an issue discussed in this 
Article in the context of the Anti-Injunction Act, is beyond the scope of this work.  At least 
one court has defined the term “tax” very broadly for this purpose.  See Henderson v. Stalder, 
407 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Tramel v. Schrader, 505 F.2d 1310, 1315 (5th Cir. 
1975) (defining a tax as an “extraction of property from a private person by a sovereign for 
its use”)).  In addition, the Declaratory Judgment Act precludes any declaratory judgments 
“with respect to Federal taxes.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).  Although the language of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act is broader than the language of the Anti-Injunction Act, the statutes 
have been interpreted to be coterminous.  See Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 733 n. 7 (acknowledging 
that a number of courts have held the two statutes as coterminous, but finding no occasion for 
the Court to resolve in case at bar) (internal citations omitted); see also Cohen v. United States, 
650 F.3d 717, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (highlighting precedent that interprets the Declaratory 
Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act as coterminous).  An exception is provided in the 
statute for declaratory judgments relating to the determinations of the tax-exempt status of 
certain organizations.  I.R.C. § 7428 (2012).  This exception was added by the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 and has mitigated the hardship that the preclusion of a pre-enforcement remedy 
imposed upon tax exempt organizations.  Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 
1306, 90 Stat. 1520, 1717 (1976).  A discussion of cases involving the tax-exempt status of 
organizations is available in footnotes 39-46 of this text.  
 5. The Tax Court has operated as a court of record under Article I of the Constitution 
since 1969.  See I.R.C. § 7441 (2012) (establishing the United States Tax Court as a 
Constitutional court).  Its predecessors, the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court of the 
United States, were both executive branch agencies.  The former was created in 1924 and 
operated until 1942 when it was re-designated as the Tax Court of the United States.  See 
Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336 (1924) 
(establishing the Board of Tax Appeals); see also Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 
ch. 619, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 798, 957 (1942) (establishing the Tax Court of the United States).  
Congress believed that its placement within the executive branch raised questions about its 
ability to act impartially as a judge of executive agency actions.  Tax Reform Act of 1969, S. 
Rep. No. 91-552, 302 (1969).  At present, the court is comprised of nineteen judges, appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate to fifteen year terms, who can be removed from 
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determines that there is a deficiency in the tax shown on income, estate, or 
certain excise tax returns, or if no returns were filed, then it must send the 
taxpayers a statutory notice of deficiency.
6
  The taxpayer may then petition 
the Tax Court to review the deficiency claim within ninety days (150 days if 
the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States) after the 
statutory notice was mailed.
7
  The I.R.S. is precluded from assessing or 
collecting the tax in question during the ninety day period (or 150 day period, 
if applicable) and, if a petition to the Tax Court is filed, during the pendency 
of the Tax Court’s proceedings.
8
 
Section 7421 provides several exceptions to its general prohibition.  
Collection activity may be enjoined in certain circumstances involving a 
spouse seeking relief under the innocent spouse provisions of I.R.C. section 
6015 and injunctions may be issued to prevent assessments and collections 
during the pendency of Tax Court proceedings.
9
  In addition, as a result of 
perceived abuses by the I.R.S. in its collection processes, Congress provided 
taxpayers with the right to an administrative hearing upon the filing of a 
notice of lien and prior to levy.
10
  Taxpayers may appeal the resultant 
determination to the Tax Court.  Collection activity must cease during the 
pendency of the proceedings, and such activities may be enjoined by the Tax 
Court or any other proper court.
11
 
 
the bench only for cause.  I.R.C. § 7443(b)-(f) (2012).  Subject to certain exceptions, a 
decision of the court is reviewable by the United States Court of Appeals and the court 
considers itself bound by the rulings of the Court of Appeals to which the particular case 
before it is appealable.  I.R.C. § 7482 (2012); see also Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 
(1970) (determining that judicial administration of the United States Tax Court is better when 
decisions by the appropriate Court of Appeals are followed).  The Supreme Court set forth 
the framework for determining whether the scope of authority conferred upon a non-Article 
III tribunal violates Article III, section 1 of the Constitution in Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), an analysis of which is beyond the scope of this work. 
 6. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (2012). 
 7. I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. (providing for enjoinment exceptions to the section 7421 prohibition).   
 10. I.R.C. §§ 6320(c), 6330(d)(1). 
 11. I.R.C. § 6330(e).  Several other exceptions exist.  The federal district court may, 
among other exceptions, issue an injunction to prevent irreparable harm to the property rights 
of others in the context of a levy or sale of property by the I.R.S.  I.R.C. § 7426(b)(1).  
Moreover, third parties are expressly provided standing to vindicate an interest in property 
that has been wrongfully levied.  I.R.C. § 7426(a).  Exceptions to the statute are also provided 
for collection activities undertaken during the pendency of a Tax Court proceeding 
challenging federal liens and levies, with respect to certain partnership related matters, levy 
and distraint proceedings, jeopardy assessments and levies, controversies regarding 
employment status, and certain payroll tax matters.  See I.R.C. § 7421(a).  
MELONE_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017  2:51 PM 
932 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19.4 
 
A. Tax or Penalty 
A threshold question is whether the exaction subject to challenge is, in 
fact, a tax subject to the statute.  In National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, the controversial case that upheld the individual health 
insurance mandate imposed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, the Court’s opinion placed significant emphasis on the label that 
Congress chose to give to an exaction.
12
  The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act added section 5000A to the Internal Revenue Code, 
requiring that individuals maintain a certain level of health insurance 
coverage for themselves and dependents each month beginning after 2013.
13
  
Failure to meet this requirement for one or more months results in the 
imposition of a shared responsibility payment—which the statute terms a 
penalty.
14
   
Emphasizing that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to suits that seek to 
restrain the assessment or collection of any tax, the Court stated that “[t]here 
is no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to ‘any tax’ would 
apply to a ‘penalty.’”
15
  It considered the fact that section 5000A labels the 
exaction a penalty significant because many other exactions in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act are labeled taxes, and it is generally 
 
 12. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543-544 (2012). 
 13. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 
10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 244-49, 909-10 (2010) (codified as I.R.C. § 5000A (2012)).  The 
penalty amount imposed by the statute was amended shortly thereafter by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §1002, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032-33 
(2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 5000A (2012)).  Certain exceptions are made for individuals who 
qualify for statutorily defined religious conscience or health ministry exemptions, individuals 
who are not citizens or nationals of the United States or legal aliens present in the United 
States, incarcerated persons, members of Indian tribes, and low-income individuals.  I.R.C. 
§§ 5000A(d), 5000A(e)(1)-(3) (2012). 
 14. I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (2012).  No penalty is imposed for gaps in coverage of less than 
three months.  I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(4).  Payment of the penalty is made with a taxpayer’s income 
tax return for the taxable year which includes the month that the failure to obtain minimum 
essential coverage occurred.  I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1)-(2).  The amount of the penalty due for a 
taxable year is the lesser of the sum of the monthly penalty amounts or the amount of the 
national average insurance premiums for a particular level of coverage for the applicable 
family size involved offered through insurance exchanges.  I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(1).  The 
national average premium is determined for plans that provide a “bronze” level of coverage, 
a level of coverage that is designed to provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to sixty 
percent of the full actuarial value of statutorily enumerated benefits.  Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 
18022(b), 18022(d) (2010).  The monthly penalty amount is one-twelfth of the greater of a 
flat dollar amount or a percentage of income.  I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2).  The flat dollar amount 
is $95 per individual failure in 2014, $325 per individual failure in 2015, and $695 per 
individual failure thereafter.  I.R.C. §§ 5000A(c)(3)(A)-(B).  The latter figure is adjusted 
annually for cost of living increases beginning in 2017.  I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(D). 
 15. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 543. 
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presumed that the use of one term in one part of a statute and a different term 
in another part of that statute is intentional.
16
  According to the Court, 
Congress may determine for itself whether a particular statutory enactment 
is subject to the Anti-Injunction Act and the best evidence of such a 
determination is the text of the statute in question.
17
  Therefore, the Anti-
Injunction Act can apply to exactions that are not considered taxes for other 
purposes.
18
  Moreover, the Anti-Injunction Act can apply to penalties if 
Congress chooses to make it applicable to particular penalties.
19
 
The Court noted that the Internal Revenue Code defines the term 
“taxes” to include penalties that are codified at subchapter 68B of the Code.
20
  
However, despite the fact that the statute states that the shared responsibility 
payment shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable 
penalty under subchapter 68B, the shared responsibility payment is not found 
in subchapter 68B.
21
  The Court dismissed the argument that the language of 
I.R.C. section 6201(a), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to 
assess all taxes and parenthetically defines taxes to include assessable 
penalties, requires that the penalty be deemed a tax for purposes of the Anti-
Injunction Act.
22
  The Court unanimously held that, for purposes of the Anti-
Injunction Act, section 5000A imposes a penalty and not a tax.
23
  
Accordingly, the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to bar adjudication of the 
issues on the merits.
24
  More recently, the D.C. Circuit, citing extensively to 
Sebelius, held that the Anti-Injunction Act applied to bar a suit challenging 
a penalty imposed upon banks that failed to report interest paid to certain 
foreign account holders.
25
  The penalty at issue in the case was located in 
 
 16. Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); see e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1411 
(imposing a 3.8 percent Medicare tax on unearned income beginning in 2013), 4191 
(imposing a 2.3 percent tax on the sale of medical devices beginning in 2013), 4980I 
(imposing a forty percent tax on employers providing high cost insurance coverage beginning 
in 2018), 5000B (imposing a ten percent tax on tanning salon services to be paid by the 
individual on whom the service is performed) (2012).  
 17. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 544.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  I.R.C. section 6671(a) states that any reference in the Internal Revenue Code to 
taxes includes the penalties imposed by provisions codified in subchapter 68B.  I.R.C. § 
6671(a) (2012).  Accordingly, because the Anti-Injunction Act is part of the Internal Revenue 
Code, it applies to assessable penalties included in subchapter 68B.  
 21. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 545. 
 22. See id. (interpreting this language merely as a procedural directive to the Secretary of 
the Treasury to employ assessment and collection mechanisms with respect to the penalty 
similar to those mechanisms used to assess and collect taxes).   
 23. Id. at 546. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2429 (June 6, 2016).  
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Subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code.
26
 
The Sebelius decision was controversial because the Court held that the 
individual health insurance mandate exceeded Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause but that it was a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing 
power.
27
  Although Congress may designate an exaction a penalty for 
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, whether an exaction is a penalty or a tax 
for constitutional purposes depends on the nature of the exaction and not the 
label that Congress chooses to give it.
28
  For constitutional purposes, several 
factors caused the shared responsibility payment to resemble a tax (including 
the fact that it is paid with tax returns):  it is inapplicable to low-income 
households; its amount is based on factors such as income, the number of 
dependents, and income tax filing status; it is codified in the Internal 
Revenue Code; and it is enforced by the I.R.S.
29
 
The distinguishing feature of a penalty is its punishment of an unlawful 
act or omission; the Court determined that the statute’s provision of an 
inducement to purchase insurance need not be interpreted to make the failure 
to do so unlawful.
30
  The majority opinion discussed the three characteristics 
of penalties that were set forth in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, the child labor 
 
 26. Id. at 1067. 
 27. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 547-575. 
 28. Id. at 564. 
 29. Id. at 563-564.  The dissenting Justices found these features unpersuasive for two 
reasons.  Id. at 666-669 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).  They disagreed 
that variations in the amount of an exaction are indicative of taxes and gave no credence to 
section 5000A’s codification in the Internal Revenue Code.  Id.  They pointed out that the 
amounts of numerous penalties are influenced by the violators’ ability to pay and, moreover, 
that the placement of the mandate in the operative provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, rather than in its revenue provisions, is evidence that the shared 
responsibility payment was enacted as a penalty.  Id. 
 30. Id. at 567 (first citing United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 
518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996); then citing United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)).  
The fact that no consequences attach to the failure to purchase insurance, other than the 
requirement to pay the exaction at issue, and the fact that the Congressional Budget Office 
estimated that four million people would choose to pay the tax and remain uninsured belie 
that Congress intended that the failure to obtain insurance be considered unlawful.  Id. at 568.  
In Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922), the Court held that a provision of the National 
Prohibition Act that taxed profits from the illegal sale of alcohol at double the rate otherwise 
applicable to legal profits was a penalty and not a tax.  Id. at 561-62.  Because evidence of a 
crime was required for the tax to apply, the exaction in question was intended to punish 
violations of the National Prohibition Act and, hence, was a penalty.  An alternative 
framework with which to decide whether an exaction is a penalty or a tax was proposed by 
Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel.  See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to 
Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 U. VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012) (arguing that 
the classification of an exaction should be based on whether Congress rationally believed that 
the exaction would reduce or prevent the behavior on which the exaction is imposed). 
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tax case.
31
  First, a penalty imposes an exceedingly heavy burden regardless 
of the extent of the infraction.
32
  Second, penalties typically include scienter 
requirements.
33
  Finally, penalties are enforced by agencies other than the 
I.R.S., an agency whose function is to collect revenue.
34
  The shared 
responsibility payment does not impose an exceedingly heavy burden 
because, for most individuals, the amount due will be far less than the cost 
of insurance and can never exceed the cost of such insurance.
35
  Moreover, 
further support for the categorization of the shared responsibility payment as 
a tax is the lack of any scienter requirement, its assessment and collection by 
the I.R.S. through normal means, and the statute’s prohibition of the use of 
criminal sanctions, liens, and levies.
36
 
In light of the Sebelius decision, it appears that if Congress labels an 
exaction of a penalty that falls outside of the statutory definition of a tax, 
then the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable to that exaction regardless of the 
nature of the exaction.  Moreover, it appears that the reverse is also true.  If 
Congress labels an exaction a tax, it is subject to the Anti-Injunction Act 
regardless of its constitutional status as a penalty.  In Drexel Furniture, the 
Court held that a statute enacted in 1919 that imposed a ten percent excise 
tax on the net profits of an enterprise that employed children was 
unconstitutional because, according to the Court, the tax was, in reality, a 
penalty.
37
  Drexel Furniture and Sebelius are analogous in that the taxing 
 
 31. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 565. 
 32. Id.   
 33. Id. at 565-566. 
 34. Id. at 566. 
 35. Id. A discussion of the statutory cap on the amount of the shared responsibility 
payment is available at footnote 14 of this text.  
 36. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 566.  Taxes as a means to regulate behavior were sanctioned by 
the Court long ago.  Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940).  For 
example, the Court upheld the validity of a significant increase in excise taxes applicable to 
certain coal producers who did not join the Bituminous Coal Code, a group subject to 
regulation and price setting by a government commission: 
Clearly this tax is not designed merely for revenue purposes.  In purpose and 
effect it is primarily a sanction to enforce the regulatory provisions of the Act.  
But that does not mean that the statute is invalid and the tax unenforceable.  
Congress may impose penalties in aid of the exercise of any its enumerated 
powers.  The power of taxation, granted to Congress by the Constitution, may be 
utilized as a sanction for the exercise of another power which is granted it. 
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940). 
 37.  Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).  This case was decided 
approximately four years after Hammer v. Dagenhart, in which the Court held that it was not 
within Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce to enact a ban on the interstate 
transportation of goods manufactured with the use of child labor.  247 U.S. 251 (1918).  
Hammer was overruled by United States v. Darby, one of a series of cases that expanded the 
scope of the commerce power after the so-called “switch in time that saved nine” in the New 
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power was posited in both cases as justification for a legislative action that 
was not supportable by the commerce power.  However, a companion case 
to Drexel Furniture was not decided on the merits.  The Court held in that 
case that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the issuance of an injunction that 
prevented the assessment and collection of the tax.
38
 
B. Purpose of Suit 
The Anti-Injunction Act applies to a “suit for the purpose of restraining 
the assessment or collection of any tax.”
39
  A taxpayer’s purpose for seeking 
relief is, in the vast majority of cases, transparent—to reduce her tax liability.  
On occasion, however, taxpayers have asserted alternative purposes for their 
challenges.  For example, in Bob Jones, the petitioner challenged the I.R.S.’s 
denial of tax exempt status.
40
  Such denial was predicated on the petitioner’s 
racially discriminatory policies and threatened the petitioner’s fund raising 
objectives because its tax exempt status was necessary in order for donors to 
obtain a tax deduction for their donations to the petitioner.
41
  Moreover, 
denial of tax exempt status would subject the organization to federal income 
taxes and certain payroll tax obligations.
42
  The petitioner argued that its suit 
was not for the “purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any 
tax” but to maintain its flow of donor contributions.
43
  The Court held that 
the suit was precluded by the Anti-Injunction Act because the petitioner’s 
challenge implicated its liability for income taxes, payroll taxes, and also the 
tax liability of others—its donors.
44
  Consequently, this action fell “within 
the literal scope and the purposes of the Act.”
45
  The Court reached a similar 
conclusion in a decision that was rendered the same day in a companion case, 
Alexander v. Americans United Inc.
46
  The Court made clear that the Anti-
Injunction Act’s applicability is neither predicated on a taxpayer seeking to 
restrain the assessment or collection of its own taxes nor on whether the 
 
Deal era.  312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 38. Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 20 (1922). 
 39. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012). 
 40. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). 
 41. Id. at 727-36; see also I.R.C. §§ 170(a); 501(c)(3) (2012).  
 42. Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 730-31.  The deleterious effects of the denial or revocation of 
tax exempt status on an organization led Congress, in 1976, to amend the Declaratory 
Judgment Act to provide an exception for actions that challenge such denials or revocations.  
See supra note 4. 
 43. Id. at 738. 
 44. Id. at 738-39.  The Court acknowledged that, due to various deductions, whether the 
petitioner would owe income taxes was open to debate.  Id. at 738.  
 45. Id. at 739.  
 46. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974).  
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effect on the taxpayer is merely collateral.
47
 
In a relatively recent case, the D.C. Circuit held that a suit that 
challenged the legality of a refund process established by the I.R.S. related 
to telephone excise taxes paid but later found invalid was not barred by the 
Anti-Injunction Act.
48
  The court held that because the tax in question had 
already been assessed and collected by the I.R.S. that the suit did not seek to 
restrain the assessment or collection of any tax.  Instead, the suit challenged 
the procedures established the I.R.S. under which money would be 
refunded.
49
  The court distinguished this case from both Bob Jones and 
Alexander on the grounds that, unlike those cases, this case did not impact 
the future tax liabilities of the taxpayer.
50
  Moreover, the Court rejected a 
“single mechanism” theory of assessment and collection under which any 
suit that affects the money retained by the Treasury involves assessment and 
collection.
51
  Instead, the court held that the terms assessment and collection, 
for purposes of the Act, are to be defined as those terms are defined in the 
Internal Revenue Code.
52
  In this case, the taxes in question had long been 
assessed and collected.  With respect to the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act 
the Court stated that “[t]he principle the case law elucidates is therefore quite 
simple:  The AIA, as its plain text states, bars suits concerning the 
‘assessment or collection of any tax.’  It is no obstacle to other claims seeking 
to enjoin the IRS, regardless of any attenuated connection to the broader 
regulatory scheme.”
53
 
The Court’s rejection of a “single mechanism” theory of assessment and 
collection in this case followed from its reasoning in Foodservice & Lodging 
Institute v. Regan several decades earlier.
54
  At issue in that case were several 
regulatory provisions that implemented a restaurant tip reporting statute.  
One provision required restaurants to report total charge receipts and total 
charged tips.
55
  The regulations, in contrast, required restaurants to report 
only charge receipts in which a tip was charged.
56
  The regulation was 
challenged by the food service industry because the industry believed that 
the information that the regulation required to be provided tended to 
overstate tips.
57
  The court held that the statutory provision in question was 
 
 47. Id. at 760-61. 
 48. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 49. Id. at 725. 
 50. Id. at 726 n.7. 
 51. Id. at 726. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 727. 
 54. Foodservice & Lodging Inst. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 55. Id. at 845-46. 
 56. Id. at 846. 
 57. Id. 
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enacted to assist the I.R.S. is determining the extent of tip reporting 
compliance in the food service industry and, therefore, the challenge to the 
regulation did not implicate the assessment of collection of tax.
58
  The extent 
of industry-wide compliance with a reporting requirement and the 
assessment and collection of tax is not too attenuated because evidence of 
significant noncompliance would most likely lead to regulatory measures to 
counter such noncompliance.  However, the D.C. Circuit disagreed and 
applied the Anti-Injunction narrowly.
59
 
Most recently, the D.C. Circuit held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not 
bar a suit by an organization that alleged that the I.R.S. was unlawfully 
delaying a decision regarding its tax exempt status because the 
organization’s political views were inconsistent with the Obama 
Administration’s Middle East policies.
60
  The court distinguished this case 
from Cohen, the telephone excise tax case discussed above, because this case 
did have potential tax implications for the taxpayer in the future.
61
  However, 
in contrast to Bob Jones and Alexander, the taxpayer in this case was not 
seeking tax exempt status but only a fair and lawful process in the 
determination of its status.
62
  The court’s decision was based, in large part, 
on its belief that the organization would be left with no adequate remedy if 
its suit was barred—an exception to the application of the statute discussed 
later in this Article.
63
  However, the court did indicate that the suit was not 
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax but 
merely to prevent the I.R.S. from processing its request in an unconstitutional 
manner.
64
  It is not clear whether the court would have held similarly if it 
believed the taxpayer had an adequate remedy at its disposal.  Quite possibly, 
the court would not have so held because if the action did not involve an 
attempt to restrain the assessment of collection of any tax then it would have 
found no need to dwell on the taxpayer’s lack of an adequate remedy. 
The importance of the revenue collection function for the operation of 
 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Z St. v. Koskinen, 791 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  Similar issues were raised by a 
number of tax-exempt organizations and the allegations that the I.R.S. was discriminating 
against conservative organizations led to Congressional hearings and political headaches for 
the Obama Administration.  See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, 
Ref. No. 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT 
APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013), available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FHQ9-ZZJV] (discussing allegations of I.R.S. discrimination against 
conservative organizations). 
 61. Z St., 791 F.3d at 31. 
 62. Id. at 30. 
 63. Id. at 31-32.  
 64. Id. at 32. 
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the government provides the justification for the statutory bar to pre-
enforcement challenges to tax rules but this statutory bar is by no means the 
only evidence that the tax function is administered in a manner unlike the 
administration of other government functions.  Statutorily, the Treasury, 
with few exceptions, has been placed in an enviable position in comparison 
to other agencies.  Moreover, the Treasury has appropriated for itself various 
advantages that have been subject to much criticism and that, in light of 
recent developments, may be curtailed. 
II.   ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
The Anti-Injunction Act recognizes the importance of the federal 
government’s revenue collection function and is a manifestation of tax 
exceptionalism, the belief that the administration of the tax laws is justifiably 
different than the administration of other laws.  However, the Act is not the 
sole manifestation of this belief.  Various statutes advantage the Treasury in 
its dealings with taxpayers.
65
  Moreover, the Treasury has enjoyed 
remarkable latitude in its rulemaking with respect to the restrictions imposed 
on administrative agencies by the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Alarm at the increasing power of executive branch agencies, 
particularly during World War II, the diminishing popularity of the 
Democratic Party, and the courts’ reluctance to limit agency power led to the 
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.
66
  The objectives of 
 
 65. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7805(b)(1)(C), 7805(b)(2) (2012) (permitting tax regulations to 
have retroactive effect in certain circumstances).  Regulations, including re-issued 
regulations, may take effect on the date that notice was issued to the public that substantially 
described the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final regulations.  Id.  
Moreover, regulations that are filed or issued within eighteen months of the date that the 
statute to which the regulations relate was enacted may have retroactive effect.  Id. 
(permitting tax regulations to have retroactive effect).  General administrative law principles 
are less amenable to agency retroactive rulemaking.  See e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. 
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (finding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services did 
not have authority to impose retroactive cost-limit rules).  In addition, the I.R.S. has broad 
collection powers that private creditors can only envy.  See generally Steve R. Johnson, The 
IRS as Super Creditor, 92 TAX NOTES 655 (2001) (contemplating the unique powers of 
the I.R.S. relative to private creditors).  Not all idiosyncrasies of tax administration favor the 
government, however.  In tax litigation, no deference is given to the I.R.S.’s factual 
determinations, which are subject to de novo review.  See James M. Puckett, Structural Tax 
Exceptionalism, 49 GA. L. REV. 1067, 1103-09 (2015) (discussing the treatment of I.R.S. 
determinations in tax litigation).  See also Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax Court 
Exempt from Administrative Law Jurisprudence When Acting as a Reviewing Court?, 58 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603, 637-43 (2010) (considering the deference given by the U.S. Tax 
Court to I.R.S. conclusions of fact). 
 66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2012); Anthony W. Mongone, Note, Business 
Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny and its Implications in a Post-Dodd-Frank 
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the Act are to inform the public about agencies’ procedures, rules, and 
organization; provide the public with the opportunity to participate in the 
rulemaking process; establish standards for the promulgation of rules and 
adjudicating disputes; and set forth the scope of judicial review of agencies’ 
actions.
67
  With certain exceptions, the Act requires that notice and comment 
procedures be adhered to in the promulgation of proposed regulations.
68
  
However, the notice and comment requirements do not apply to interpretive 
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice.
69
  Moreover, notice and comment procedures may be 
dispensed with if the agency finds, with good cause, that such procedures are 
impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
70
  As discussed 
 
World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 746, 770-85 (2012).  The federal government’s role in 
the nation’s economic affairs increased in response to the industrialization of the economy 
during the nineteenth century and to the post-Civil War need to protect the newly acquired 
rights of African-Americans.  Lawrence M. Friedman, Friedman, A History of American 
Law, 439-466 (2d. ed. 1985).  The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 
marked the birth of what would become an immense federal bureaucracy and the 
Progressive period resulted in the increased regulation of railroads, the institution of 
occupational licensing, and the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Id. (considering 
how the Lochner era proved to be a temporary reprieve to the increasing role of the public 
sector in private enterprise); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a 
New York statute regulating the hours of bakers was an unconstitutional infringement on the 
right and liberty to contract).  The Lochner era, in my opinion, closed with the Court’s 
decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.  This decision upheld the constitutionality of 
Washington state’s minimum wage law and overturned an earlier precedent to the contrary, 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).  West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937).  The Supreme Court’s initial resistance to expansive federal powers over 
economic matters came to an end with its decision in the seminal case of N.L.R.B. v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp.  301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935).  Several years later, the Court laid to rest any doubts as to the 
extent of the federal commerce power.  See Wickard v. Filburn., 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
(holding that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to 
regulate activity that has an indirect effect on such commerce). 
 67. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 9 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons 1973).  This source also provides a detailed 
description and analysis of the statute.   
 68. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)-(b) (2010).  In general, final regulations may not take effect within 
30 days after notice is given.  However, this requirement is inapplicable to regulations that 
relieve burdens on those persons subject to the regulations.  5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(1) (2010).  Tax 
regulations that are favorable to taxpayers may be insulated from taxpayer challenges due to 
lack of standing.  Not all taxpayer-friendly regulations will be so insulated, however.  See 
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (holding that standing was no barrier to 
challenges to Treasury regulations that interpreted the availability of tax credits provided by 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in a manner favorable to taxpayers because 
the availability of tax credits could cause a taxpayer to be subject to the so-called individual 
mandate, the requirement to purchase health insurance).  
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2010). 
 70. Id.  An agency that invokes the good cause exception must set forth its reasons for 
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later in this Article, agencies also must provide reasoned explanations for 
their actions, a requirement that offers some assurance that agency actions 
do not implicate separation of powers issues, provides a modicum of political 
accountability, and potentially improves the quality of agency decisions.
71
 
The Treasury has been rather cavalier with the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  The Treasury derives its regulatory authority from two 
sources.  First, Congress may delegate it the authority to issue rules and 
regulations to carry out the provisions of a specific statute within the statute 
itself.  That regulatory authority typically is phrased in broad terms, such as 
the authority to prescribe regulations as may be necessary and appropriate to 
carry out the statutory provisions in question, but it is not uncommon for 
Congress to reference specific provisions of the statute in its grant of 
authority indicating its expectation that regulations will be forthcoming with 
respect to those provisions.
72
  I.R.C. section 7805(a), which delegates general 
regulatory authority to the Treasury for the enforcement of the tax laws, is a 
second source of regulatory authority.
73
 
The Treasury took the frequently criticized position that regulations 
issued under section 7805 were interpretative and, therefore, not subject to 
the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
74
  
 
doing so.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2010).  The Attorney General’s Manual and the courts have 
interpreted the good cause exception to apply in cases when timely guidance is critical and 
the notice and comment requirement would impose an impediment to such timely guidance, 
minor rules with little public interest, and the somewhat unusual case in which notice and 
comment would be counterproductive.  Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: 
Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act 
Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1781-82 (2007).  
 71. See Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L. J. 
1771, 1788 (2014) (reflecting on the reasoned explanation requirement).  See also infra notes 
98-113 and accompanying text. 
 72. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263A(i), 409A(e), 469(l) (2012). 
 73. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).  With certain exceptions, proposed, temporary, or final 
regulations cannot have retroactive effect.  I.R.C. § 7805(b).  Temporary regulations must 
also be issued in the form of proposed regulations and expire within three years of their 
issuance.  I.R.C. § 7805(e).  All published proposed and temporary regulations must be 
submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for 
comment on the impact that such regulations will have on small business.  I.R.C. § 7805(f).  
The Treasury must consider comments from the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration and discuss any response to such comments in the preamble to final 
regulations.  Id. 
 74. See Kristen E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1158 n.16. (citing a study that found, in 232 regulatory projects studied, 
that the notice and comment requirement was explicitly disclaimed in almost 92 percent of 
such projects).  See also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 
44, 55-58 (2011) (applying the same standard of deference to regulations issued under a 
general grant of authority that is applied to other regulations); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
MELONE_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017  2:51 PM 
942 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19.4 
 
Moreover, the increasing complexity of tax law, particularly after the 
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, prompted the Treasury to issue 
rules in the form of temporary regulations which are binding upon taxpayers 
without any opportunity for pre-promulgation comments by interested 
parties.
75
  Congress responded in 1988 by enacting I.R.C. section 7805I, 
which mandated the issuance of temporary regulations contemporaneously 
with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and required that such temporary 
regulations expire within three years.
76
 
The I.R.S. regularly engages in informal rulemaking through the 
issuance of Revenue Rulings and Notices, neither of which are subject to the 
Administrative Procedure Act.
77
  Rulings are designed to apply the law to a 
 
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating that oftentimes legislative delegations 
are implicit); Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(holding that regulations promulgated pursuant to I.R.C. section 7805 have the force of law); 
Hickman, supra note 74, at 1760-73.  See also ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task 
Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW 717 (2004) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report] 
(discussing the Treasury’s use of Temporary Regulations).  Congress exhibited a modicum of 
concern with this practice and expressly required the Treasury to comply with the provisions 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act regardless of whether the regulations were legislative or 
interpretative.  5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2010). 
 75. Hickman, supra note 74, at 1160.  See Michael Asimov, Public Participation in the 
Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW 343, 343 (1991) (questioning whether 
the Treasury’s use of temporary regulations complied with the Administrative Procedure Act).  
In a study conducted by Professor Hickman, the Treasury frequently asserted that the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to regulations, whether 
temporary or final, due to the good cause exception.  See Hickman, supra note 74, at 1749-
51. 
 76. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6232(a), 
102 Stat. 3342, 3734-35 (1988) (codified at I.R.C. § 7805(e) & (f)).  Recently, the Treasury 
issued temporary and proposed regulations to hinder inversion and post-inversion transactions 
pursuant to which a domestic corporation relocates its domicile in a low tax jurisdiction but 
maintains significant operations in the country of its former domicile.  See generally Temp. 
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.304-7T; 1,367(a)-3T; 1.367(b)-4T; 1.956-2T;1,7701(l)-4T;1.7874-1T-4T; 
1.7874-6T-12T (2016).  The issuance of these regulations reportedly scuttled the pending 
Pfizer-Allergan merger, as well as other pending transactions.  Katie Thomas & Chad Bray, 
Pfizer Weighs Split as Allergan Deal Collapses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2016, at B1; Domenic 
Chopping & Ben Tita, Tax Inversion Rules Complicate Crane Deal, WALL ST. J., April 28, 
2016, at B3 (reporting that the new rules could derail a merger between Terex Corp. and 
Konecranes Oyj); see infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.  
 77. Revenue Rulings are official, published interpretations of the tax law applicable to a 
particular set of facts and are designed to both promote the uniform application of the tax 
laws and to assist in taxpayers’ compliance with such laws.  See Rev. Proc. 2003-1, C.B. 1 
(Jan. 2003) (stating that the revenue procedure explains to taxpayers the kind of guidance 
the Service provides, how to request it, and how it is provided); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 
C.B. 814, 814-15 (Jan. 1989) (setting forth the standards for publication of rulings and 
procedures).  Rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations, although they may be 
used as precedent by taxpayers.  26 C.F.R. § 601.601 (d)(2)(v)(d).  The deference that a 
court will afford Notices, in comparison to Revenue Rulings, is unclear.  Compare 
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specific set of facts and, to that extent, can be fairly described as 
interpretative.  Notices, however, are often used to provide guidance pending 
the issuance of a ruling or proposed regulations and frequently contain 
substantive interpretations of the tax law.  Although Notices provide 
taxpayers with welcome guidance pending the conclusion of formal 
rulemaking, they also have been used to advance controversial positions 
without any opportunity for public comment.
78
 
The Anti-Injunction Act imposes a significant procedural obstacle to 
taxpayers who wish to challenge the legality of burdensome formal or 
informal Treasury rules.  With respect to allegedly unlawful rules that confer 
a benefit on all or a portion of the taxpayer population, the Treasury is 
immune to legal challenges and its actions are subject only to political 
repercussions—a result of the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence.
79
 
 
Constantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 980-81 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that Revenue 
Rulings are entitled to greater deference) with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 
78, 99 (1993) (stating that Revenue Rulings and Notices are entitled to equal deference).  
 78. Perhaps the best example of the use of Notices in this manner was Notice 2008-83.  
This Notice, issued during the height of the financial crisis in 2008, was criticized by tax 
experts and members of Congress as a bailout to the banking industry.  See Matthew A. 
Melone, A Leg to Stand On: Is There a Legal and Prudential Solution to the Problem of 
Taxpayer Standing in the Federal Tax Context?, 9 PITT. TAX REV. 111-14 (2012).  
 79. Federal taxpayer standing jurisprudence had its genesis in the 1923 case Frothingham 
v. Mellon.  In that case, a taxpayer alleged that federal expenditures under a statute increased 
her tax bill in violation of due process.  Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).  The 
Court denied the taxpayer standing because the effect of the expenditures on her federal tax 
liability was “so remote, fluctuating, and uncertain” and that “his interest in moneys of the 
Treasury . . . is shared with millions of others.”  Id. at 487.  Per the Court, federal judicial 
power can be invoked by a party upon a showing “not only that the statute is invalid, but that 
he has sustained . . . some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he 
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”  Id. at 488.  The Court has 
been similarly unreceptive to suits brought by members of Congress that allege an institutional 
injury but have allowed allegations of personal injury to proceed.  See Raines v. Byrd, 521 
U.S. 811 (1997) (finding that Congress members did not have standing based solely on loss 
of political power); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (allowing suit where member 
of House of Representatives was excluded despite meeting the Article I Section 2 standing 
requirements of the Constitution); see also Shays v. FEC, 414 F. 3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(affirming that congressmen had standing to bring suit where the FEC exposed them to 
competition intensified by BCRA-banned practices and deprivation of fair reelection 
contests).  Legislators may have standing to challenge executive action in the absence of a 
particularized individual harm if they have undertaken the challenge in a representational 
capacity.  For example, a committee of the House of Representatives had standing to enforce 
a subpoena issued by the committee to a member of the executive branch.  Comm. On 
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2008).  
See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983) (stating, in dicta, that “Congress is the 
proper party to defend the validity of a statute when a Government agency, as a defendant 
charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is unconstitutional”).  
In United States v. Windsor, the case that struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, the 
Bipartisan Litigation Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives petitioned to 
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The objectives of the Administrative Procedure Act are laudable, but 
the Act has its critics.  The procedural requirements imposed on agencies can 
result in delays in the issuance of needed guidance or the reluctance to issue 
guidance due to the fear of legal challenges.
80
  Moreover, compliance with 
the Act is costly and such compliance often does little to prevent well-heeled 
or influential parties from controlling the information upon which an agency 
formulates its guidance.
81
  The negative consequences of compliance with 
the Act are not unique to tax rulemaking but, given the reach of the tax laws 
and general antipathy toward tax compliance, such consequences are 
particularly deleterious in the tax area.
82
  As previously noted, the law has 
recognized, in various ways, the exceptional nature of the government’s 
revenue collection function.
83
  The Anti-Injunction Act is perhaps the most 
prominent example of tax exceptionalism. 
In recent years, the extent to which tax rules are permitted to exist apart 
from the general population of administrative rules has been called into 
question.  In 2011, the Supreme Court seemingly handed the Treasury a 
major victory with respect to the deference that its tax regulations enjoy.
84
  
However, that victory may have come at a steep price because the Court 
pointedly rejected the notion of tax exceptionalism.
85
  As a result, Treasury 
actions have been subject to challenge under administrative law doctrines 
that were rarely, if ever, applied to tax rules. 
A. Deference: A Crack in the Armor of Tax Exceptionalism 
The seminal case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. held that a very deferential standard of review was applicable 
 
intervene to defend the statute as an interested party after being notified by the Attorney 
General that the Department of Justice would not defend the statute’s constitutionality. 133 
S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  While the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether BLAG had 
standing on its own right, Justices Alito and Thomas believed that BLAG did have standing, 
and would maintain the standing of a member of Congress to defend the constitutionality of 
any statute provided that the member has the institutional imprimatur to do so.  Id. at 2686-
2688.  
 80. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, The Perfect Process is the Enemy of the Good Tax: 
Tax’s Exceptional Regulatory Process, 35 VA. TAX REV. 553, 579-580 (2016) (explaining 
that pre-notice rulemaking requires a serious commitment of agency resources when it comes 
to issuing guidance).  
 81. Id. at 583-85. 
 82. Id. at 589-602, 611-12. 
 83. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011) 
(holding that the Chevron standard applied to all Treasury regulations issued after notice and 
comment). 
 85. Id. at 55-56. 
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to agency action that had been subject to notice and comment.
86
  This 
standard employs a two-step inquiry.  Step one inquires whether the subject 
of the agency action directly addresses the precise question at issue and, if 
not, step two inquires whether the agency action is arbitrary, capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
87
  So long as the statute is 
sufficiently ambiguous, agency action will not be disturbed unless it is 
arbitrary, capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
88
  
 
 86. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Deference to agency 
actions existed long before the Chevron decision.  In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the Court held 
the level of deference that an agency’s action warrants depends upon the thoroughness of the 
agency’s deliberations, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and other factors which provide the agency with the power to persuade.  323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  This rather vague standard was thought not to offer meaningful 
guidance by Justice Scalia.  See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (opining that this standard’s resort to the totality of the circumstances is not 
practical in the modern administrative state).  In 1979, the Court applied a multi-factor test—
the so-called National Muffler test—to determine whether Treasury regulations issued under 
the general authority of I.R.C. section 7805(a) were a permissible interpretation of a statute.  
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).  The Court 
examined whether the regulations in question were a contemporaneous construction of the 
statute promulgated with the awareness of congressional intent, the length of time that the 
regulations were in effect, the degree of reliance placed on the regulations by affected parties, 
the consistency of the agency’s position, and the degree of scrutiny given the regulations by 
Congress during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.  Id.  The Court later applied this test 
in two cases decided not long after its National Muffler decision and, in both cases, noted that 
less deference is owed to Treasury interpretations issued pursuant to I.R.C. section 7805.  
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 
452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981). 
 87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-844.  The Chevron two-step test is more deferential than 
the National Muffler test in several respects.  For example, under Chevron, whether the 
agency’s action is consistent with its previous position on the matter at hand and whether the 
regulation had been issued contemporaneously with the statute are not relevant to the level of 
deference due the agency.  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
545 U.S. 967, 1001 n.4 (2005) (stating that the lack of consistency does not undermine the 
case for deference); Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 748 (2004) 
(deferring to a regulation that upset a longstanding agency position to the contrary); Smiley 
v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) (applying Chevron deference to regulations issued 
approximately a century after the enactment of the statute).  Moreover, the Court has held that 
Chevron deference is owed to regulations that are contrary to previous judicial holdings 
regarding the meaning of statutory terms.  See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981-982 (deferring to an 
agency interpretation that was a reversal of actual agency policy). 
 88. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.  Chevron deference is not always applicable to regulations 
that clarify statutory ambiguities.  In King v. Burwell, the Court upheld Treasury regulations 
that made available tax credits to purchasers of health insurance on federal exchanges.  135 
S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  However, the Court did not apply Chevron.  Id.  According to the Court, 
deference under Chevron is premised on the notion that statutory ambiguities “constitutes an 
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”  Id. at 2488 
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).  This 
premise may not be warranted in extraordinary cases and this was such a case.  
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Chevron was premised on prudential grounds and acknowledged that the 
modern administrative state demands that agencies possess specialized 
knowledge beyond the “ordinary knowledge” possessed by the courts.
89
  The 
expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than district judges 
issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.  Federal judges lack the scientific, 
economic, and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with 
issues of this order.”
90
  Ostensibly, Chevron pays fealty to congressional 
intent and separation of powers, but its constitutional underpinning should 
not be exaggerated.
91
 
 
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars in 
spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of 
people.  Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a 
question of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to this 
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it 
surely would have done so expressly.  It is especially unlikely that Congress 
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting 
health insurance policy of this sort.  This is not a case for the IRS. 
Id. at 2489 (internal citations omitted). 
 89. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 90. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011).  Chevron also rested 
on the notion of congressional intent and the concomitant political accountability that follows.  
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  Judicial deference to agency action is warranted because “[t]he 
power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program 
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, 
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”  Id. at 843.  Critics often question the political 
legitimacy of agency actions because of the inordinate influence that the regulated 
constituency often exerts over the regulator, influence that is based, in part, on resource and 
information disparities, political influence, and the revolving door between agencies and their 
regulated constituents.  David J. Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1458, 1473-75 (2013).  The House of Representatives passed the 
Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016), which would 
require de novo judicial review of all relevant questions of law and agency rules. 
 91. The link between the Constitution and Chevron is tenuous.  Deference is invited by 
sweeping delegations of authority from Congress to agencies.  Such delegations may either 
violate separation of powers principles or come close to doing so.  As the Court made clear 
in Field v. Clark, Congress cannot delegate its Article I legislative powers.  143 U.S. 649, 692 
(1892).  Additionally, broad delegations of regulatory authority to agencies may constitute an 
impermissible delegation by Congress of its legislative authority.  The Court has applied an 
“intelligible principle” test, described in Mistretta v. United States, to determine whether a 
congressional delegation is too broad:  
Applying this “intelligible principle” test to congressional delegations, our 
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical 
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power 
under broad general directives.  Accordingly, this Court has deemed it 
“constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the 
public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.” 
488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (internal citations omitted). 
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Scholars have debated whether the two steps of the Chevron test are 
redundant.  Stephenson and Vermeule assert that “[t]he single question is 
whether the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory 
interpretation; the two Chevron steps both ask the question, just in different 
ways.  As a result, the two steps are mutually convertible.”
92
  Richard Re, in 
a compelling counterargument, asserted that Chevron step one provides the 
answer to the question of whether Congress left only one permissible 
interpretation of a statute.
93
  If, under Chevron step one, a genuine statutory 
ambiguity exists, then Chevron step two defers to any number of 
interpretations, so long as they are reasonable.
94
 
The standard by which courts were to determine whether and to what 
extent to defer to Treasury regulations issued under I.R.C. section 7805(a) 
was set forth in National Muffler not long before the Chevron decision.
95
  
After Chevron, the continuing vitality of the National Muffler standard was 
unclear due to a distinction between explicit and implicit delegations 
seemingly made by Chevron itself.
96
  Some commentators, including the 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act precludes judicial review of actions committed to 
agency discretion by law.  5 U.S.C. § 701(2) (2012).  The Court has held that this exception 
is to be construed narrowly, applicable in the rare instances where the statutory terms are so 
broad that there is no law to apply.  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 410-11 (1971).  The non-delegation doctrine set forth in Mistretta appears to be in tension 
with the “no law to apply” standard set forth in Overton Park.  See Viktoria Lovei, Revealing 
the True Definition of APA § 701(a)(2) by Reconciling “No Law to Apply” with the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (2006) (explaining that when Congress 
passes a statute that confers a large degree of authority upon the executive, there is a conflict 
between the non-delegation doctrine and the agency discretion exception of the 
Administrative Procedure Act).  Moreover, a constitutional underpinning to Chevron 
putatively renders any statutory rejection or limitation on judicial deference unconstitutional.  
For example, the Freedom of Information Act mandates de novo review of government actions 
to withhold records from the public.  Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, and FOIA, 73 
MD. L. REV. 1060 (2014). 
 92. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 597, 599 (2009). 
 93. Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L. J. 605, 610-16 (2014). 
 94. Id. 
 95. National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
 96. The Court stated: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation.  Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.  
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is 
implicit rather than explicit.  In such a case, a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency. 
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
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American Bar Association, believed that Chevron set forth two separate step-
twos: an arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute test for 
regulations promulgated under explicit congressional delegations of 
authority, and a less deferential reasonable interpretation standard for 
regulations promulgated under implicit congressional delegations of 
authority.
97
  Consequently, the deference afforded to regulations issued 
pursuant to I.R.C. section 7805(a) by National Muffler is appropriate after 
Chevron.
98
 
After Chevron, the Court continued to apply the National Muffler test, 
somewhat inconsistently and often confusingly, to Treasury regulations 
issued under I.R.C. section 7805.
99
  As a result, confusion and contradiction 
emanated from the lower courts and the Tax Court as to whether Chevron 
replaced National Muffler, whether they are in fact similar, and when to 
apply one standard versus the other.
100
  Critics of the application of Chevron 
 
 97. See Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in Light 
of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAWYER 481, 495 
(2008) (explaining that the Chevron Court set forth two standards: an “arbitrary-and-
capricious standard” and “a permissible-construction standard”); ABA Task Force Report, 
supra note 74, at 739 (asserting that specific authority regulations are subject to an “ arbitrary 
and capricious” standard while general authority regulations are subject to a “reasonableness” 
standard). 
 98. Id. at 737-38.  The Court made clear that the Skidmore standard survived Chevron at 
least with respect to informal rulemaking.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
234-36 (2001) (explaining that Chevron did not overrule Skidmore and stating that this case 
may lend itself to a Skidmore claim); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 
587 (2000) (stating that Skidmore deference is applicable to informal agency actions such as 
opinion letters, manuals, guidelines, and policy statements); Nelson v. Comm’r, 568 F.3d 662, 
665 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying Skidmore deference to revenue rulings); Kornman & Assoc., v. 
U.S., 527 F.3d 443, 452-57 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding that revenue rulings are entitled to 
Skidmore deference).  Not everyone has concluded revenue rulings are entitled to Skidmore 
deference.  See Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. U.S., 522 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 
2008) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (concluding that Chevron deference was appropriate for 
a Revenue Procedure).  The Department of Justice has indicated that it will not argue for the 
application of Chevron deference to revenue rulings and revenue procedures.  See Marie 
Sapirie, DOJ Won’t Argue for Chevron Deference for Revenue Rulings and Procedures, 
Official Says, 131 TAX NOTES 674 (2011) (reporting on the Justice Department’s decision not 
to argue for Chevron deference and citing Gilbert Rothenberg, the acting deputy assistant 
attorney general in the DOJ’s Tax Division). 
 99. See Berg, supra note 97, at 502 (noting that since Chevron, “the Tax Court as well as 
the courts of appeals have been wrestling with the question of Chevron’s effect (if any) on the 
National Muffler standard”); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax 
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1579-86 (2006) (describing 
the inconsistency in the courts’ application of deference standards to tax cases). 
 100. Berg, supra note 97, at 500-16 (discussing a number of Circuit Court cases and Tax 
Court cases in which different standards were applied).  In one case, the Tax Court stated that 
the National Muffler standard “has not been changed by Chevron, but has merely been restated 
in a practical two-part test with possibly subtle distinctions as to the role of legislative history 
and the degree of deference to be accorded to a regulation.”  Cent. Pa. Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 
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to tax regulations asserted a sort of tax exceptionalism pursuant to which a 
lesser standard of deference was justified for tax regulations.
101
 
In 2011, the Court’s decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical 
Education & Research v. United States dismissed notions of tax 
exceptionalism and held that the Chevron standard applied to all Treasury 
regulations issued after notice and comment.
102
  Mayo upheld a tax regulation 
promulgated pursuant to the general grant of authority under I.R.C. section 
7805 that denied medical residents an exemption from payroll taxes.
103
  The 
Court forcefully rejected the notion that tax regulations are somehow entitled 
to less deference than the regulatory action of other agencies. 
Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less 
deferential standard of review to Treasury Department regulations 
than we apply to the rules of any other agency.  In the absence of 
such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to 
administrative review good for tax law only.  To the contrary, we 
have expressly “[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a 
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.” . . .  
Filling gaps in the Internal Revenue Code plainly requires the 
Treasury Department to make interpretive choices for statutory 
implementation at least as complex as the ones other agencies must 
make in administering their statutes. . . .  We see no reason why 
our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency 
expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of 
other regulations.
104
 
 
104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995). 
 101. According to some, the inherent advantages enjoyed by the I.R.S. over taxpayers, the 
severity of tax penalties, the sweep of the revenue collection function, and the complexity of 
the tax code justify special treatment for tax administration.  See ABA Task Force Report, 
supra note 74, at 723-25 (highlighting the advantages enjoyed by the I.R.S.).  The idea of tax 
exceptionalism is not universally held.  See Hickman, supra note 99, at 1592-98 (disagreeing 
with the arguments of tax exceptionalists, who believe that a more “diluted” version of 
Chevron should be applied to general authority Treasury regulations). 
 102. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55-57 (2011). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 55-56.  The Court also made clear the distinction between the Chevron and 
National Muffler standards and why the former is significantly more deferential than the latter.  
Id. at 54-55.  Chevron left a number of issues—tax and otherwise—unresolved and Mayo did 
not resolve all deference questions with respect to Treasury actions.  Two scholars posed 
fourteen questions that they believe Chevron left unanswered in addition to the basic question 
of whether there are certain subject matters for which deference is not appropriate.  See 
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L. J. 833, 849-52 
(2001) (identifying the unresolved questions that have come up in lower courts and that have 
led to circuit splits).  For example, whether Chevron deference is predicated on the issuance 
of regulations after notice and comment is not clear.  Mayo hinted that notice and comment is 
a prerequisite for Chevron deference but did not say so categorically.  “The Department issued 
the full-time employee rule only after notice-and-comment procedures, again a consideration 
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After Mayo, the deference to which Treasury regulations issued after 
notice and comment are entitled no longer depends upon their source of 
authority.  Mayo, therefore, was a win for the Treasury, and it may embolden 
the Treasury to exercise its interpretative authority more aggressively, or, 
alternatively, it will provide an impetus for the Treasury to submit to notice 
and comment procedures more frequently.
105
  It may do both.  Mayo, 
however, ultimately may prove to be a hollow victory.  The Court’s 
unequivocal rejection of tax exceptionalism in that case has opened the door 
to the application of general administrative law principles that have largely 
gone unnoticed in the tax area. 
 
identified in our precedents as a ‘significant’ sign that a rule merits Chevron deference.”  
Mayo, 562 U.S. at 57-58 (first quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 
(2001), and then quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173-74 
(2007)).  Thus, whether temporary Treasury regulations are entitled to Chevron deference is 
unlikely, and, if not, whether National Muffler or Skidmore deference should apply is unclear.  
The Seventh Circuit, however, indicated that it would apply Chevron deference to temporary 
regulations, at least those that have been replaced by nearly identical final regulations issued 
after notice and comment: 
This temporary regulation, which was issued without notice and comment at the 
same time as an identical proposed regulation, purports to offer taxpayers 
guidance by resolving an open question and stating definitively that in the case 
of a disposition of property, an overstatement of basis can lead to an omission 
from gross income.  This temporary regulation has since been replaced by a nearly 
identical final regulation, issued after a notice and comment period.  Because we 
find that Colony is not controlling, we need not reach this issue.  However, we 
would have been inclined to grant the temporary regulation Chevron deference, 
just as we would be inclined to grant such deference to T.D. 9511.  We have 
previously given deference to interpretive Treasury regulations issued with 
notice-and-comment procedures, and the Supreme Court has stated that the 
absence of notice-and-comment procedures is not dispositive to the finding of 
Chevron deference.   
Beard v. Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099, 
182 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2012). 
It is not clear whether proposed regulations are entitled to any deference whatsoever although 
the Court has indicated that such regulations are not so entitled.  Boeing Co. v. U.S., 537 U.S. 
437, 453 n.13 (2003) (rejecting the taxpayer’s reliance on proposed regulations and stating, 
“we find these proposed regulations to be of little consequence given that they were nothing 
more than mere proposals”). 
 105. See Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 
32 VA. TAX REV. 269, 275-78, 289-98 (2012) (setting forth the benefits of the Mayo decision 
but cautioning that Mayo could lead to Treasury overreach).  A recent study of the Circuit 
Courts’ application of Chevron found that it is invoked less frequently in tax cases but, when 
invoked, the Treasury’s win rate is relatively high.  Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, 
Article, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (Table 2, 
manuscript at 49). 
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B. The State Farm Doctrine 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court may invalidate agency 
actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law.
106
  One year before Chevron, the Court decided the 
seminal case concerning the Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard, Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.
107
  The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act of 1966 directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue practical and 
objective motor vehicle safety standards and, in so doing, to consider all 
relevant safety data, the reasonableness and practicality of proposed safety 
standards, and whether such standards will contribute to carrying out the 
purpose of the statute.
108
  The Department of Transportation issued several 
standards between 1967 and 1978, first requiring automobile manufacturers 
to install seatbelts and later requiring full passive front seat occupant restraint 
systems, airbags or automatic seatbelts, in model year 1984 vehicles.
109
  In 
1981, the Department ordered a one-year delay in the new standard, later 
proposed a rescission of the standard, and eventually rescinded the 
standard.
110
 
 
 106. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2010).  Courts may also set aside agency action that is contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; taken without observance of required 
procedure; a decision in certain hearings that are unsupported by substantial evidence; or 
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial de novo.  5 U.S.C. §§ 
706(2)(B)-(F) (2010).  Unless a statute provides otherwise, only final agency actions are 
reviewable by a court.  5 U.S.C. § 704 (2010).  In general, a person suffering legal wrong 
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2010).  However, 
agency actions are not subject to judicial review if a statute precludes such review or the action 
is committed to agency discretion by law.  5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1)-(2) (2010).  For a discussion 
of actions committed to agency discretion and the non-delegation doctrine, see supra note 91 
and accompanying text. 
 107. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29 (1983). 
 108. Id. at 33-34. 
 109. Id. at 34-37.  Originally, passive restraints were required in all vehicles manufactured 
after August 15, 1975.  Id. at 25.  In the two years preceding the effective date of the passive 
restraint requirement, vehicles could be manufactured with passive restraint or shoulder belts 
coupled with an ignition lock.  Id.  The shoulder belt/ignition lock option was selected by 
most manufacturers but the unpopularity of this feature led Congress to amend the statute in 
1974 to foreclose this option.  Id.  The effective date was later postponed for approximately 
one year and then suspended pending the outcome of a demonstration project.  Id.  Finally, a 
new Secretary of Transportation had the Department of Transportation issue the new standard 
in 1978.  Id. at 37.  The standard was to be phased in first with large cars in model year 1982 
and then to all cars by model year 1984.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 38. 
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The agency assumed that airbags would be installed in sixty percent of 
new cars but the vehicle manufacturers planned to meet the standard in 
approximately ninety-nine percent of new cars through the installation of 
automatic seat belts.
111
  Because most automatic seat belts could be 
disengaged with relative ease, the agency believed that the costs to comply 
with the standard would be unreasonable in light of the minimal safety 
benefits to be derived from its imposition.
112
  Moreover, the agency believed 
that the public’s attitude toward vehicle safety would be soured by the 
imposition of an expensive, yet ineffective, standard.
113
 
State Farm and an automobile insurance trade group challenged the 
rescission of the safety standard and the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 
agency’s rescission because it believed that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the agency’s conclusion regarding seat belt use, and because the 
agency failed to give proper consideration to either a requirement to install 
non-detachable seat belts or a requirement to install airbags.
114
  The Court 
agreed with the D.C. Circuit that rescission of a regulation is reviewable 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard but it held so in more sweeping 
terms. 
115
  The Court stated that “the revocation of an extant regulation is 
substantially different than a failure to act” and obligates an agency “to 
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required 
when an agency does not act in the first instance.”
116
 
According to the Court, the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow 
and does not sanction the substitution of a court’s judgment for that of the 
agency.
117
  An agency must articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
and there must be a rational nexus between the facts found and the agency’s 
action.
118
  An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if the agency:  (1) relied 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 39. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 39-40.  The court held that the rescission was reviewable under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard and that such rescission was not analogous to a failure to issue 
regulations.  Id.  The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a court to compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.  5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2010).  However, the courts 
are much more reluctant to compel agency action than they are to invalidate actions once such 
actions are taken, and will do so only if they find that the agency has a clear, nondiscretionary 
duty to act.  See Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative 
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 461, 465-66 (2008) (describing the 
difference between judicial review of agency inaction and agency action, and explaining the 
difficulty of obtaining judicial review of agency inaction).  Agency inaction is often 
considered committed to agency discretion by law or not considered final agency action, and 
therefore, unreviewable.  Id. 
 115. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 43. 
 118. Id. (citing Burlington Truck Lines v. U.S., 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
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on factors that Congress did not intend it to consider; (2) entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the issue in question; (3) offered an 
explanation that is counterfactual; or (4) offered an explanation that is so 
implausible that it belies a difference of opinion or agency expertise.
119
  An 
agency’s reasoning, if opaque, may be discerned by a court,
120
 but, pursuant 
to SEC v. Chenery Corp., the judiciary cannot provide a reasoned basis for 
an agency’s action that the agency itself has not advanced.
121
  The Court held 
that the rescission of the passive restraint requirement was arbitrary and 
capricious because the ineffectiveness of detachable seat belts does not 
provide a rational basis for rescinding the airbag requirement and, with 
respect to automatic seatbelts, the agency failed to consider evidence 
regarding the effect that detachable seat belts would have on vehicle 
safety.
122
 
1. Is State Farm Distinct from Chevron? 
Several scholars and the American Bar Association have asserted that 
Chevron and State Farm implicate similar inquiries and that the discernment 
of a conceptual distinction between the two standards is difficult.
123
  Chevron 
step two is unlikely to be met either by actions supported by counterfactual 
or implausible justifications or by actions that fail to consider an important 
aspect of the issue in question.  However, despite their oft-stated similarity, 
State Farm and Chevron are not the same.  Chevron examines whether an 
agency has reasonably interpreted the law,
124
 whereas State Farm seeks an 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). 
 122. Id. at 48-49.  The Court found that the Department of Transportation gave no 
consideration to amending the standard to mandate airbags in light of its position that 
detachable seat belts are not effective.  Id. at 50.  The agency’s assertions that airbags create 
difficulties in the production of small cars and that public reaction to mandatory airbags would 
be negative were, according to the Court, post hoc rationalizations.  Id.  Chenery mandates 
that agency action, if it is to be sustained, be based on the reasons articulated by the agency 
when it took action.  Id. (first citing Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168; then citing SEC 
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196; and then citing Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 
452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981)).  The Court acknowledged that agencies often operate in the face 
of uncertainty and that judgments may be drawn from facts and probabilities.  However, an 
agency must do more than merely recite “substantial uncertainty” as its rationale for an action.  
Id. at 51-52.  Instead, it must rationally connect the facts found with the choice made and 
justify why it is rescinding a rule before searching for further evidence.  Id.  The Court found 
the Department of Transportation’s reliance on various data and its consideration of a 
“continuous passive” seat belt option inadequate.  Id. at 52-56. 
 123.  See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 162-64 (2010) (arguing 
there is “little meaningful difference” between Chevron and State Farm).  
 124. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
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articulated, reasonable factual and/or policy basis for an agency’s action.
125
  
Although both State Farm and Chevron will yield the same result in many, 
if not most, cases, the tests are not identical.  Chevron rests on notions of 
agency expertise and congressional intent, but State Farm has other 
justifications, including the imposition of discipline on agency decisions, the 
legitimization of agency action, and the enablement of judicial review.
126
 
Chevron step two permits any number of agency choices provided that 
those choices are reasonable.
127
  In contrast, State Farm asks why the agency 
made a particular choice.  An agency’s choice may be permissible in the 
abstract yet be inadequately justified.  In State Farm, the Department of 
Transportation had significant latitude to take action under the statute
128
 and 
a variety of possible approaches—for example, passive seat belts only, air 
bags only, seat belts for certain cars and air bags for others, or manual seat 
belts with an interlock or buzzer feature—would probably have passed 
muster under Chevron step two.
129
  State Farm however, required the agency 
to articulate the reasoning to support the choice it made.  In Mayo, medical 
residents were subjected to payroll taxes by regulation because the Treasury 
chose to address the status of medical residents on the basis of hours worked 
and not on the primary purpose of the work performed.
130
  This choice is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious in substance nor contrary to the statute, and 
the Treasury articulated satisfactory reasons for its choice.
131
  Had the 
Treasury failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision the regulation in 
question would have been invalidated under State Farm but not under 
Chevron.  Chevron step two is, or should be, applied in the abstract.  If 
statutory language permits an action, then State Farm requires that a hard 
look be taken at the reasons behind the action.  This failure of Chevron step 
two inevitably will result in a concomitant failure of the State Farm test.  
Meanwhile, the opposite is not necessarily true.
132
 
 
 125. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42.  Justice Breyer has noted that the law versus facts 
distinction between the two tests is counterintuitive because of its implication that the courts 
are more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation of law than to an agency’s factual and 
policy conclusions.  Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness 
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 765 (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of 
Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 394 (1986)). 
 126. See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, 
Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L. J. 1811, 1820-23 (2012) (laying out theories of reason 
giving in the administrative context). 
 127. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 128. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 33-34. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 49-50 (2011). 
 131. Id. at 59-60 (explaining that the Treasury Department justified its actions on the basis 
of administrative efficiency and the policy underlying the Social Security Act). 
 132. Chevron and State Farm are most similar in circumstances that do not involve 
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2. State Farm and Tax Regulations 
The Supreme Court has never examined tax regulations under the State 
Farm standard.
133
  Recently, State Farm has surfaced in two tax cases.
134
  In 
one case, a court applied both Chevron and State Farm to invalidate a 
Treasury regulation.
135
  In the other, a case with significant financial 
ramifications for multinational enterprises, a court invalidated a Treasury 
regulation under State Farm.
136
 
a.  Dominion Resources 
I.R.C. section 263A sets forth rules for the capitalization of costs 
attributable to real or personal property produced by a taxpayer and to real 
or personal property acquired by a taxpayer for resale.
137
  Under the statute, 
interest costs incurred during the production period and allocable to real 
property and certain personal property with a long useful life are subject to 
 
statutory interpretation.  In such circumstances, the determination of whether an agency 
action is permissible in the abstract cannot be ascertained without examining the factual 
basis for the action.  However, a statutory interpretation that requires no empirical data for 
support, as was the case in Mayo, or a statutory interpretation for which no reasoned 
explanation is put forth, as was the case in State Farm, may be permissible in the abstract.  
For example, assume that a statute requires that compensation must be reasonable to be 
deductible and that reasonableness is to be determined based on compensation paid for 
comparable work in comparable circumstances.  If the Treasury issued a regulation that 
determined reasonableness based on some metric such as profit, revenue, or some other such 
variable, then whether this regulation is a permissible interpretation of the statute depends 
on whether the factual data supports that such a rule approximates comparable pay 
standards.  If not, it is not a permissible interpretation but this cannot be determined until a 
hard look review of the Treasury’s reasoning takes place.  In a deportation case, Justice 
Kagan stated the Court would have reached the same conclusion whether it reviewed a 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ action under Chevron step two or State Farm.  Judulang v. 
Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011).  See Aaron Saiger, Agencies’ Obligation to Interpret the 
Statute, 69 U. VA. L. REV. 1231, 1234-46 (2016) (arguing that an agency has an ethical 
obligation to put forth the best interpretation of statute and not any interpretation that will 
pass muster under a statute). 
 133. Two scholars recently examined all Supreme Court decisions between 1983 and 2014 
that involved an arbitrary and capricious holding.  See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin 
Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1407-12 (2016) (listing all arbitrary and 
capricious holdings).  Their compilation included one tax case, Mayo.  However, the Court 
did not review the Treasury regulation at issue in that case under State Farm.  See Mayo, 562 
U.S. at 52 (applying only Chevron). 
 134. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Altera Corp. 
v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015). 
 135. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
 136. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015). 
 137. I.R.C. § 263A(a-b) (2012). 
MELONE_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017  2:51 PM 
956 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19.4 
 
capitalization.
138
  In addition to interest on any debt that is directly 
attributable to production expenditures with respect to a property, interest on 
any other debt is assigned to property under production to the extent that 
such debt could have been reduced if the production expenditures had not 
been incurred.
139
  Consequently, if production is financed by equity, internal 
cash flow, or other non-debt sources of funds, then interest expense on any 
debt can be capitalized under the theory that debt unrelated to production 
could have been reduced but for the production expenditures.  The Treasury 
issued regulations that defined production expenditures, in the case of the 
purchase of property for further production, to include the adjusted basis of 
other property that is temporarily idled by the production, thus adding to the 
total production expenditures and increasing the amount of interest that must 
be capitalized. 
140
  Dominion Resources challenged the validity of the 
regulation, and the Court of Federal Claims, applying Chevron, granted the 
government’s motion for summary judgment.
141
  This decision was reversed 
by the Federal Circuit Court because, according to the court, the regulation 
in question failed both Chevron step two and the State Farm test.
142
 
The court believed that the statute’s definition of production 
expenditures did not speak directly to the issue at hand and, therefore, 
Chevron step one was satisfied.
143
  However, the court held, for three reasons, 
that the requirement to include the basis of idled property in the production 
costs for which interest must be capitalized was not a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.
144
  The court further held that the regulation was 
 
 138. I.R.C. §§ 263A(f)(1), 263A(f)(4)(A) (2012).  The interest capitalization rules also 
apply to property whose estimated production period exceeds two years or whose estimated 
production period exceeds one year and whose cost exceeds one million dollars.  I.R.C. §§ 
263A(f)(1)(B)(ii-iii). 
 139. I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(1-2). 
 140. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B) (1994) (defining accumulated production 
expenses for improvements to real property). 
 141. Dominion Res., Inc. v. U.S., 97 Fed. Cl. 239 (2011), rev’d, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 
2012).  The court upheld the regulation despite its finding of several internal inconsistencies 
within the regulations and its belief that the regulation’s interpretation of the statute stretched 
the bounds of reasonableness.  See id. at 257.  
 142. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’g, 
97 Fed. Cl. 239 (2011). 
 143. Id. at 1317. 
 144. Id. at 1318.  First, the court noted that no debt could have been reduced had 
production expenditures not been incurred.  The cost of the idled property cannot be an 
avoided cost because such cost had already been incurred prior to production.  Id.  The 
Treasury’s position makes sense only under the assumption that the idled facility could have 
been sold and the sale proceeds used to pay down debt—an assumption that belies reality 
because such a sale obviates the very reason for any improvement to the property.  Id. at 1318-
19.  Second, the court held that the plain meaning of production expenditures is an amount 
actually expended or spent.  Id. at 1318.  Moreover, the statute determined the amount of 
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arbitrary and capricious under State Farm—the first appellate court to 
invalidate a tax regulation—because the Treasury offered no rationale either 
when it issued the Notice that provided guidance on the forthcoming 
regulation or when it issued the regulation in proposed or final form.
145
 
In concurrence, Judge Clevenger explicitly distinguished Chevron step 
two from State Farm.
146
  He agreed that the regulation should be invalidated 
under State Farm.
147
  However, he did not believe that the regulation should 
have been invalidated under Chevron step two because the Treasury’s 
position could be supported for several reasons.
148
  Judge Clevenger then 
succinctly captured the distinction between Chevron and State Farm.  The 
application of Chevron “creates a binding rule (at least in this circuit) that 
the government can never re-promulgate its associated-property rule for 
property temporarily withdrawn from service, no matter how well-formed its 
reasoning.”
149
  An agency can, in fact, advance a position that, in the abstract, 
is a reasonable interpretation of a statute but that is insufficiently justified. 
 
interest to be capitalized based on the amount of debt that could have been reduced had no 
production expenditures been incurred.  Id. at 1317.  The basis of existing property is not an 
amount that is incurred by a taxpayer.  Id.  This rationale is somewhat puzzling.  If the statute 
plainly foreclosed such a regulation, then Chevron step one was not met.  If the meaning of 
the terms “expended,” “spent,” and “incurred” are plain, then the statute does speak to the 
precise issue at hand.  Finally, the court concluded that the Treasury regulation could lead to 
absurd results because the adjusted basis of idled property bears little relation to the cost of 
improvements.  Id. at 1318.  Consequently, the same improvement could result in significantly 
different amounts of interest capitalized.  Id.  Dominion’s two improvements were 
comparable in cost yet the regulations required vastly different amounts of interest to be 
capitalized solely because the adjusted basis of the two idled properties that were improved 
differed by over $100 million.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 1319.  In Mannella v. Commissionerr, the court upheld the validity of a 
Treasury regulation under Chevron.  631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011).  The dissent quoted from 
State Farm, but the quote was used to support the argument that Chenery precluded the court 
from considering the Treasury’s assertions in this case.  Id. at 127 (Ambro, J., dissenting).  
State Farm surfaced in a number of Tax Court cases over twenty years ago.  See Patrick J. 
Smith, Mannella, State Farm, and the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard, 131 TAX NOTES 
387, 393 n.44 (2011) (listing citations of State Farm in the Tax Court).  
 146. Dominion Res., Inc., 681 F.3d at 1320 (Clevenger, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1321.  See, e.g., id. at 1321-22 (explaining that the idling of a facility does result 
in the incurrence of costs—lost revenue).  Moreover, the regulation minimizes the opportunity 
for tax evasion because the regulation prevents a taxpayer from temporarily placing such a 
property in service to avoid interest capitalization.  Id. at 1322. 
 149. Id. at 1322-23.  See Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the 
Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553 (discussing the 
circumstances in which a court will or will not remand a matter to an agency for further 
consideration); see also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-
51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that in certain circumstances, remand without vacatur is 
appropriate). 
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b.  Altera 
The prevention of tax base erosion through the improper shifting of 
income to foreign subsidiaries by U.S. corporations has been a long-standing 
tax policy.
150
  I.R.C. section 482 attempts to determine the “true taxable 
income” of a controlled taxpayer by putting such taxpayer in “tax parity with 
an uncontrolled taxpayer.”
151
  This statute grants the I.R.S. broad authority 
to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, and 
allowances among controlled taxpayers as is necessary in order to prevent 
tax evasion or to clearly reflect the income of such entities.
152
  Treasury 
regulations have promulgated the “arm’s length” standard, under which the 
terms of a transaction among controlled taxpayers must be similar to the 
terms of comparable transactions among uncontrolled taxpayers.
153
  The 
difficulty in determining comparable terms for transfers of intangible assets 
led Congress to amend the statute in 1986 to require that the income with 
respect to a transfer or license of intangible assets be commensurate with the 
income attributable to the intangibles.
154
  This standard requires the retention 
by the transferor of a “super royalty” that is subject to ex post adjustments 
based on the income generated from the intangible in question.
155
  According 
to the Treasury, the commensurate with income standard did not supplant, 
but is consistent with, the arm’s length standard.
156
 
The enactment of the commensurate with income standard was not 
intended to prohibit the use of bona fide research and development cost-
 
 150. See Charles Duhigg & David Kosieniewski, Inquiry Into Tech Giants’ Tax Strategies 
Nears End, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.4, 2013, at B1; Charles Duhigg & David Kosieniewski, How 
Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 2012, at A1 (discussing companies’ 
attempts to income shift). 
 151. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (2012); Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 400 
(1972).  A controlled taxpayer is a taxpayer directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the 
same interests.  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(5) (2012).  A controlled taxpayer also includes a 
taxpayer that owns or controls other taxpayers.  Id.  For this purpose, control is broadly 
defined.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(4) (2012) (defining controlled for the purposes of this 
section). 
 152. I.R.C. § 482 (2012). 
 153. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (2012). 
 154. I.R.C. § 482. 
 155. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Xilinx Revisited, 126 TAX NOTES 1621 (March 29, 2010); 
H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 423-26 (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2) (2011) (describing 
adjustments for transfers of intangible property).  It is not clear whether the commensurate 
with income standard is consistent with, or supersedes, the arm’s length standard.  See 
Deborah Brubaker Burns, Golden Apple of Discord: International Cost-Sharing 
Arrangements, 15 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 55, 68 n.57-58 (2015) (discussing the IRS’s 
comparison of the commensurate with income standard and the arm’s length standard). 
 156. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 7, 21 (1988). 
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sharing arrangements.
157
  Compliance with the regulations allows taxpayers 
to avoid messy factual disputes and the concomitant uncertainty of whether 
these arrangements meet the arm’s length standard.
158
  The regulations 
require that development costs be shared by the parties to a cost-sharing 
arrangement in proportion to their share of reasonably anticipated benefits.
159
  
To that end, they require that stock-based compensation costs directly 
identified with, or reasonably allocable to, the development of intangible 
property be included in the cost pool subject to the cost-sharing 
arrangement.
160
 
Altera Corporation, a Delaware corporation, challenged the 
requirement to include equity-based compensation in the cost pool subject 
to the cost sharing arrangement.
161
  Altera and its Cayman Island subsidiary 
entered into a research and development cost-sharing agreement.
162
  Altera 
compensated certain employees who performed research and development 
 
 157. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-481 (Vol. II), at II-637-38 (1986). 
 158. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (2013) (defining the arm’s length standard). 
 159. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (2013) (explaining methods to determine taxable income when 
a cost-sharing agreement is in place). 
 160. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(3)(i-ii).  The amount and timing of such costs are 
determined under the rules that govern the deductibility of such costs.  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
7(d)(3)(iii)(A).  However, a taxpayer may elect to determine the amount and timing of the 
costs of stock options on publicly traded stock under generally accepted accounting 
principles as reflected in the taxpayer’s audited financial statements.  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
7(d)(3)(iii)(B).  Stock grants are taxable to the recipient and deductible by the employer at the time 
the stock is transferable by the recipient or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever 
occurs earlier.  I.R.C. § 83(a) (2012).  The amount of income recognized by the transferee from 
such a transaction is the excess of the fair market value of the property received over the amount 
paid by the recipient for such property.  I.R.C. § 83(a)(1-2).  Correspondingly, the transferor of the 
property is entitled to a compensation deduction, at the time the recipient of the property recognizes 
income, equal to the amount includible in the income of the recipient.  I.R.C. § 83(h).  If, however, 
the stock is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, then the income recognition and the 
corresponding deduction is postponed until such time that the risk of forfeiture lapses.  See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (1985) (describing procedures in case of the property being at a 
substantial risk of forfeiture).  However, the recipient of restricted property may elect to 
accelerate the incidence of taxation to the time that the property is transferred and this 
election also accelerates the employer’s compensation deduction.  I.R.C. §§ 83(b); 83(h).  
With respect to compensatory stock options, income recognition and the compensation 
deduction are postponed until the date of exercise or disposition provided that, at the time the 
option is granted, it has no readily ascertainable fair market value.  Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (1978).  
Under generally accepted accounting principles, a grant of restricted shares is valued at the 
date of grant and such amount is charged to expense over the vesting period.  See generally 
SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 123, §§ 16, 39 (Fin. Acct. 
Standards Bd. revised 2004).  This standard conformed U.S. accounting standards with 
international accounting standards.  See generally SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Int’l Accounting 
Standards No. 2 (Int’l Acct. Standards Bd. 2004).  Stock options are valued at the date of 
grant pursuant to one or more option pricing models.  Id., Appendix A at §§ A13-A37. 
 161. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015). 
 162. Id. at 93. 
MELONE_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017  2:51 PM 
960 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19.4 
 
activities in part with stock options and other forms of equity-based 
compensation and the costs associated with this compensation were not 
included in the cost pool.
163
  The I.R.S. allocated approximately $80 million 
in income to Altera Corporation from its Cayman Island subsidiary as a 
result of its addition of the equity-based compensation paid to research and 
development personnel to the cost pool subject to the cost-sharing 
arrangement between the companies.
164
 
Accordingly to the court, the Treasury was required to provide an 
empirical basis for its position and, therefore, State Farm supplied the 
appropriate standard of review.
165
  The regulations failed to pass muster 
under State Farm for four reasons.
166
  First, because the Treasury was unable 
to produce any evidence that unrelated parties share equity compensation 
costs, the regulations lacked any basis in fact.
167
  Second, the regulations’ 
application to all cost-sharing arrangements belied a rational connection with 
the regulations and the facts found by the Treasury.
168
  The Treasury’s 
assertion that no unrelated party transactions exist for cost-sharing 
arrangements for the development of high-profit intangibles, if true, indicate 
that the regulations should have distinguished between cost-sharing 
arrangements for the development of such intangibles and those 
arrangements for the development of other intangibles.
169
  Instead, all cost-
sharing arrangements are subject to the same rules.
170
  Third, the court 
believed that the Treasury’s response to the comments it received concerning 
the regulations was inadequate.
171
  Finally, the court held that the regulations 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 94. 
 165. Id. at 119. 
 166. Id. at 119-131.  The Treasury argued that Chevron supplied the appropriate standard 
of review in this case because the interpretation of I.R.C. section 482 requires no empirical 
evidence.  Id. at 123.  The court, however, concluded that whether the regulation complied 
with the arm’s length standard, which always require an analysis of comparable unrelated 
party transactions, is an empirical question and is in no way dependent on statutory 
interpretation.  Accordingly, State Farm provides “the more apt analytic framework.”  Id. at 
119 (citing Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011)).  
 167. Id. at 121-22. 
 168. Id. at 113. 
 169. Id. at 125-26. 
 170. Id.  Support for a uniform rule on the ground of administrative convenience was not 
sufficient because the Treasury did not articulate this reason for the rule.  Id.  Moreover, even 
if this rationale was articulated, the Treasury provided no facts to determine whether the rule 
is justified by its purported administrative benefits.  Id. 
 171. Id. at 126-30.  Written comments were submitted to the Treasury and testimony given 
at a public hearing by several prominent law and accounting firms, trade associations, and 
academics regarding the regulation at issue.  Id. at 104.  The comments and testimony asserted 
that no contracts between unrelated parties included equity-based compensation in the cost 
pool subject to cost-sharing.  Id. at 104-05.  A survey of members of the American Electronics 
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were contrary to the evidence because no evidence was presented to 
contradict the evidence presented against the regulation, evidence whose 
credibility was not challenged.
172
  The court dismissed the Treasury’s 
admonition that the harmless error rule should be applied to save the 
regulations.
173
 
The Tax Court’s decision is puzzling for two reasons.  First, the court 
reviewed the Treasury regulation at issue against the arm’s length standard 
as if that standard is set forth in a statute, but the standard is a creature of 
Treasury regulations.
174
  The cost-sharing regulations interpret the 
commensurate with income standard and its relationship to the arm’s length 
standard.
175
  The Treasury was interpreting both the statute and its own 
regulations.  Consequently, whether the regulations permissibly construed 
the commensurate with income standard should have been determined 
under Chevron step two and whether the regulations were permissible in 
light of the long-standing regulatory-based arm’s length standard should 
have been determined under the standards of Auer v. Robbins.
176
  Because 
 
Association and model contract provisions used in the petroleum industry provided further 
support that such costs are not subject to cost-sharing between unrelated parties primarily 
because such costs are speculative, uncertain, and outside the control of the compensating 
party.  Id.  Also noted by commentators was the fact the federal procurement regulations 
prohibit the inclusion of equity compensation in the cost pool subject to federal government 
reimbursement.  See id. at 106 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-6(i) (2013)).  Two economists also 
argued that compensatory stock options do not result in any cost to the grantor of the options.  
Id. 
 172. Id. at 131. 
 173. Id.  The harmless error rule is based on section 706 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act and allows a court to uphold an agency action if the agency’s mistake was not outcome 
determinative.  Id. at 131-32.  The court was not persuaded by the Treasury’s assertions that 
it had sufficient alternative reasons for its position and that subsequent developments in 
financial reporting evidenced that its position is settled policy.  Id. at 132-33.  The Treasury 
never indicated that it was prepared to rely on any reasons other than the arm’s length standard 
as a basis for its adoption of the regulation and, due to treaty obligations, it was not clear that 
the agency would have underpinned the rule on something other than the arm’s length 
standard.  Id. at 132.  With respect to subsequent financial reporting development, the court 
held that such developments were not relevant because the Treasury itself disavowed financial 
reporting standards in promulgating the rule and, in any event, Chenery precludes reliance on 
ex post developments.  Id. at 133. 
 174. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). 
 175. See Notice 88-123, supra note 156 (stating that the “commensurate with income” 
standard is consistent with the “arm’s length” standard); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-481 (Vol. 
II), at II-637-38 (1986) (indicating that bona-fide research arrangements are permissible under 
the “commensurate with income” standard).  See also supra notes 152-58 and accompanying 
text. 
 176. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1991).  Under Auer, an agency’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous regulation is given controlling weight unless such interpretation is inconsistent 
with the regulation or statute or is plainly erroneous.  Id. at 461.  Auer deference is not due to 
an agency if its interpretation is not the result of “fair and considered judgment,” conflicts 
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the legislative history of the commensurate with income standard stated 
that cost-sharing arrangements were permissible if such arrangements 
provided for a sharing of all costs, the inclusion of equity compensation 
costs in the cost pool is, in my opinion, a reasonable interpretation of that 
standard.
177
  Moreover, the inclusion of equity-based compensation in the 
cost pool does not appear to be plainly inconsistent with the arm’s length 
standard and, therefore, the regulation should pass muster under Auer.  At 
this point, under State Farm, the rule chosen by the Treasury must be 
adequately justified.
178
 
Second, and more problematically, the Tax Court failed to understand 
the purpose of the cost-sharing regulations and, as a result, it required the 
Treasury to produce evidence that is nonexistent.  The cost-sharing 
regulations, designed in response to the administrative burdens and 
regulatory uncertainty imposed by I.R.C. section 482, are a safe harbor.
179
  
Taxpayers have every right to ignore the cost-sharing regulations if they are 
willing to risk noncompliance with the other rules set forth in the 
regulations.  In many respects, the arm’s length standard is a fiction 
because it assumes that transactions between unrelated parties and 
transactions among controlled group members share similar economic 
attributes—a dubious assumption in a post-industrial economy in which the 
creation and use of intangible assets is central to wealth creation.  Because 
intangible assets often are efficiently deployed only in the context of a 
controlled group and require exclusivity to protect market share, 
comparable transactions do not exist.
180
 
 
with a prior interpretation, or represents a “convenient litigating position” or a “post-hoc 
rationalization.”  Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 170 (2012) (first 
quoting Auer, 519 U.S.at 562; then quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 
213 (1988); then quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462)).  In a recent case, the Fourth Circuit held 
that the Department of Education’s interpretation of its regulations under Title IX of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 that required schools to treat transgender students consistent with their 
gender identity was entitled to deference under Auer.  See G.G. ex. rel. Grimm v. Gloucester 
Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated sub nom., Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. 
G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239, (2017).  But see Texas v. U.S., 201 F.Supp.3d 810, 832-34, 836 (N.D. 
Tex. 2016) (granting preliminary injunction) (holding that Auer deference was inapplicable 
to the Department’s interpretation). 
 177. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-481 (Vol. II), at II-637-38 (1986). 
 178. See Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 34 (1983) (holding that the agency must present an “adequate basis and explanation” 
for a rule). 
 179. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b).  
 180. Controlled groups have collective assets—management, information systems, 
sources of financing, institutional memory, brand equity, and culture, for example—that lead 
such groups to enter into transactions that would not be offered to anyone outside the group.  
Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations and the 
Sourcing of Affilated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 642-47 (2007).  
MELONE_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017  2:51 PM 
2017] WHO NEEDS CHEVRON? 963 
 
State Farm requires that the Treasury provide a reasoned explanation 
for the adoption of the rule in question.
181
  The preamble to the regulations 
parroted the legislative history of the commensurate with income standard 
when it explained that the cost-sharing rules attempt to clearly reflect income 
among related parties when comparable unrelated party transactions do not 
exist.
182
  The Treasury’s long battle against tax base erosion provided it with 
the intuition that research and development arrangements among controlled 
entities have no counterparts among unrelated parties.  Agency intuition, as 
noted by the Supreme Court, is entitled to deference in certain cases because 
“there are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be 
marshaled.”
183
 
Whether one agrees with the application of State Farm in either case is 
not relevant here.  The salient point is that State Farm has surfaced, with 
some ferocity, in tax cases.  An open question is whether a State Farm 
challenge can survive the Anti-Injunction Act. 
III.  PFIZER-ALLERGAN MERGER AND THE ANTI-INVERSION 
REGULATIONS 
A. Background 
The United States, unlike many countries, taxes its citizens and 
residents on their worldwide income.
184
  Tax jurisdiction over foreign 
taxpayers, however, is exercised under a source-based scheme.
185
  Foreign 
nonresident alien individuals and corporations are subject to U.S. income tax 
on their income from sources within the United States, and the tax scheme 
varies considerably depending on whether the U.S. source income is 
 
Moreover, the transactional approach of the arm’s length standard often fails to properly 
source the parties’ allocable share of non-routine, or residual, profits.  See Bret Well & Cym 
Lowell, Tax Base Erosion: Reformation of Section 482’s Arm’s Length Standard, 15 FLA. 
TAX REV. 737, 745-65 (2014) (discussing one-side and two-sided pricing methodologies and 
the deficiencies in the former methodology). 
 181. State Farm, 371 U.S. at 168. 
 182. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 107-09 (2015). 
 183. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009). 
 184. Mechanisms to avoid double taxation include tax treaties and the foreign tax credit.  
This credit allows U.S. citizens or residents to credit, within statutorily defined limits, foreign 
taxes paid against their U.S. income tax liability.  I.R.C. §§ 901-08 (2012). 
 185. For example, corporate inversion transactions have as their objective the replacement 
of the U.S.-based parent of a corporate group with a foreign corporation based in a low tax 
jurisdiction.  These and other “earnings stripping” transactions have resulted in recent 
legislative changes.  U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 108TH CONG., REP. ON EARNING STRIPPING, 
TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter 
TREASURY REP. ON EARNINGS STRIPPING]. 
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effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United 
States.  The net income connected with such trade or business is taxed at 
graduated tax rates.
186
  Otherwise, absent a statutory exemption or contrary 
treaty provision, a flat thirty percent tax is levied upon the gross income 
generated from certain specified classes of U.S. source income.
187
 
Consequently, a foreign corporation is not subject to U.S. tax if it 
conducts no business in the United States and has no income that is sourced 
in the United States.  Subject to certain exceptions, a U.S. shareholder in a 
foreign corporation is taxable on dividends that it received from the foreign 
corporation.
188
  If the earnings of the foreign corporation are not repatriated 
then no tax is due to the United States.  The disparity in the tax schemes 
applicable to U.S. and foreign corporations has led to various attempts by 
U.S. taxpayers to engage in transactions to avoid U.S. taxation of worldwide 
income including the use of intercompany debt and aggressive transfer 
pricing for intercompany transactions to strip earnings from U.S. 
corporations and shift such earnings to an affiliated foreign corporation.
189
 
 
 186. I.R.C. § 882(a) (2012).  The performance of personal services within the United 
States, subject to a minor exception, constitutes the conduct of a trade or business within the 
United States.  I.R.C. § 864(b) (2012).  Trading in stock, securities, or commodities for the 
taxpayer’s own account will not, unless the taxpayer is a dealer in such stock, securities, or 
commodities, constitute a trade or business.  I.R.C. §§ 864(b)(2)(A)(ii), 864(b)(2)(B)(ii) 
(2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(c)(2) (1975).  Direct ownership of property, with its 
concomitant right to management and exposure to liability, is required for trade or business 
status.  Higgens v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941).  Manufacturing activities, on the other 
hand, invariably are trades or businesses.  Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(b), Ex. 1 (2005).  Similarly, 
the purchase and sale of goods will constitute a trade or business.  Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(b), 
Ex. 2 (2005).  The U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued the United States Model 
Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006 (U.S. Model Treaty), whose provisions are a 
starting point for negotiations with foreign nations.  With respect to the taxation of business 
profits, the U.S. Model Treaty provides that the profits earned by a foreign enterprise are not 
taxable by the source country unless the enterprise carries on business through a permanent 
establishment, defined as a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise 
is wholly or partly carried on, situated in the source country.  U.S. Model Treaty, art. 7(1) 
(2006).  Gain from the disposition of a U.S. real property interest is treated as income that is 
effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business.  I.R.C. § 897(a) (2012).  
United States’ real property interests are broadly defined to include fee ownership interests, 
co-ownership interests, leaseholds, options, and interests in certain corporations, partnerships, 
trusts, and estates.  I.R.C. §§ 897(c)(6)(A), 897(g) (2012). 
 187. I.R.C. § 881(a) (2012).  The tax is generally withheld at the source.  See I.R.C. §§ 
1441-42 (2012).  Treaty provisions often provide for reduced rates of tax on such income.  Id. 
 188. See I.R.C. §§ 951-965, 1293-1295 (2012) (stating that in certain circumstances 
shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation must include certain amounts of taxable 
income generated by the controlled foreign corporations prior to the repatriation of such 
earnings). 
 189. See generally TREASURY REP. ON EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 185, at 11-23, 55-
61 (discussing, at length, the extent of tax base erosion through the use of intercompany debt 
and aggressive transfer pricing). 
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Corporate inversion transactions, which have occurred for some time, 
result in the restructuring of a U.S. based multi-national group of 
corporations so that the ultimate parent of the group is a foreign 
corporation.
190
  As a result, the future profits of foreign subsidiaries are not 
subject to U.S. tax because the shareholder of such subsidiaries is not 
subject to U.S. tax.  Moreover, inversions often are accompanied by other 
maneuvers, such as the use of intercompany debt and the transfer of 
intangibles to foreign members of the group, to reduce reportable profits 
from U.S. operations.
191
 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 added section 7874 to the 
Internal Revenue Code to mitigate the erosion of the U.S. tax base caused by 
inversion transactions.
192
  This provision did not preclude the existing tax 
treatment of such transactions.  Instead, unless the foreign corporation has 
substantial business activities in its country of incorporation relative to its 
worldwide operations, the tax treatment of an inversion is based on the stake 
that the shareholders of the domestic corporation retain in the post-inversion 
foreign corporation.  A detailed analysis of section 7874 is beyond the scope 
of this work.  In brief, if the shareholders of the domestic corporation own, 
after the acquisition, at least eighty percent of the stock of the foreign 
corporation by reason of their former ownership of the domestic corporation 
then the foreign corporation will be treated as a domestic corporation for tax 
purposes.
193
  If shareholders of the domestic corporation own, after the 
acquisition, at least sixty, but less than eighty, percent of the stock of the 
foreign corporation by reason of their former ownership of the domestic 
corporation then the foreign corporation is considered a surrogate foreign 
corporation and the income and gain that arises from transfers of assets by 
the domestic entity and its U.S. affiliates for a ten year period are subject to 
 
 190. OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY 107TH CONG., CORPORATE 
INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3-4 (May 2002), available at 
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/millstein-
center/panel_1_001_office_to_tax_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE9D-UQRT].  The 
methods by which such a result is effectuated vary.  Id. at 4-6.  
 191. Id. at 6-7.  There are other tax consequences that result from inversion transactions, 
including the potential for immediate gain recognition as a result of transfers to foreign 
entities.  See generally I.R.C. § 367(a) (2012) (denying tax favored treatment for certain 
transfers of property by a U.S. corporation by treating such corporation, for this purpose, as a 
non-corporate taxpayer).  A discussion of the immediate tax implications of these transactions 
is beyond the scope of this work.  Also, regulations were issued in October 2016 that restrict 
the ability of U.S. corporations to strip earnings through the use of intercompany loans.  Treas. 
Reg. §§1.385-1–4 (2016). 
 192. American Job Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
 193. I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2012).  Stock of the foreign corporation sold in a public offering 
related to the acquisition of the domestic corporation is disregarded.  I.R.C. § 7874(c)(2)(B) 
(2012). 
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U.S. tax.
194
  If shareholders of the domestic corporation own, after the 
acquisition, less than sixty percent of the stock of the foreign corporation by 
reason of their former ownership of the domestic corporation then section 
7874 is not applicable.
195
  Transfers of properties and liabilities are 
disregarded if such transfers are part of a plan a principal purpose of which 
is to avoid the purposes of the statute.
196
 
The statute grants the Treasury the authority to issue regulations to 
determine whether a corporation is a surrogate foreign corporation, including 
rules related to the treatment of warrants, options, convertible securities, and 
other equity-flavored instruments as stock and to treat stock as not stock.
197
  
In addition, the Treasury is granted broad authority to issue regulations to 
prevent avoidance of the statute.
198
  In 2009, the Treasury exercised its 
authority when it issued a regulation that required that the ownership stake 
of multiple domestic corporation shareholders be combined for the 
determination of whether the statutory ownership thresholds are met if the 
acquisition of such multiple domestic corporations were part of the same 
plan.
199
  That same year, the I.R.S. announced, in Notice 2009-78, that stock 
issued by the foreign corporation in an offering, whether a public offering or 
otherwise, related to the acquisition of a domestic entity in exchange for cash 
or liquid assets would be disregarded for purposes of determining whether 
the statute’s ownership thresholds are met.
200
  Temporary regulations were 
issued in 2014 that incorporated the guidance set forth in the Notice.
201
  In 
2015 and 2017, further guidance was provided by the I.R.S. and the Treasury 
that clarified certain rules, tightened others, and provided de minimis 
exceptions to the application of previously issued rules.
202
 
In April 2016, the Treasury issued temporary regulations that contained 
rules discussed in the previously issued Notices.
203
  However, the new 
regulations also contained a new multiple acquisition rule pursuant to which 
any stock issued by a foreign corporation in prior acquisitions of domestic 
corporations that occurred during the three year period before the execution 
 
 194. I.R.C. § 7874(a) (2012).  
 195. Id. 
 196. I.R.C. § 7874(c)(4). 
 197. I.R.C. § 7874(c)(6). 
 198. I.R.C. § 7874(g). 
 199. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-2(e) (2009). 
 200. I.R.S. Notice 2009-78, 2009-2 C.B. 452. 
 201. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-4T(i)(7) (2014).  I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-2 C.B. 
712, also indicated that such a rule was forthcoming. 
 202. I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775; Guidance for Determining Stock 
Ownership; Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions, 82 Fed. Reg. 5388 
(January 18, 2017). 
 203. Inversions and Related Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 20588 (April 8, 2016) (codified in 
various sections of 26 C.F.R.). 
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of the agreement of the acquisition in question, whether or not such previous 
acquisitions were part of a plan to avoid the statute, is disregarded.
204
  Despite 
the fact that affected parties had no opportunity to comment and the Treasury 
failed to explicitly indicate a good cause for the need for immediacy, this 
rule was effective immediately.
205
 
In November of 2015, Pfizer Inc., the U.S. pharmaceutical corporation, 
and Allergan plc, an Irish corporation, announced an inversion transaction, 
a plan to merge into a new corporation that would be incorporated in 
Ireland.
206
  Allergan plc itself was the product of several transactions 
including a stock transaction with Actavis plc earlier in 2015.
207
  Actavis plc 
was the product of a 2013 inversion transaction between Actavis, Inc., a U.S. 
corporation, and Warner Chilcott, PLC, an Irish corporation, and a later 
acquisition of Forest Laboratories, Inc., another U.S. corporation.
208
  Because 
of the multi-step acquisition rule described above, the stock issued in the 
Warner Chilcott and Forest Laboratories acquisitions would be disregarded.  
Consequently, the Pfizer shareholders’ percentage ownership of the post-
merger entity would exceed the eighty percent statutory threshold thereby 
causing the post-merger entity to be taxed as a U.S. corporation.  Pfizer and 
Allergan subsequently scuttled the deal pursuant to an “adverse tax law 
change” clause in their agreement.
209
  The Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States and the Texas Association of Business have filed suit alleging 
that the multi-step acquisition rule is arbitrary and capricious under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.
210
 
 
 204. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-8T (2016). 
 205. Inversions and Related Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 20588, 20904 (April 8, 2016). 
 206. Press Release, Allergan, Pfizer and Allergan to Combine (Nov. 23, 2015), available 
at http://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/pfizer-and-allergan-to-combine 
[https://perma.cc/ZY4Q-HQPX]. 
 207. Press Release, Allergan, Actavis Completes Allergan Acquisition (March 17, 2015), 
available at http://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/actavis-completes-
allergan-acquisition [https://perma.cc/H87V-B9VE]. 
 208. Press Release, Allergan, Actavis Completes Warner Chilcott Acquisition (Oct. 1, 
2013), available at http://www.allergan.com/investors/news/thomson-reuters/actavis-
completes-warner-chilcott-acquisition [https://perma.cc/VT9P-V6YK]; Press Release, 
Allergan, Actavis Completes Forest Laboratories Acquisition (July 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.allergan.com/investors/news/thomson-reuters/actavis-completes-forest-
laboratories-acquisition [https://perma.cc/X4GU-4PNB]. 
 209. Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer Announces Termination of Proposed Combination with 
Allergan (April 6, 2016), available at http://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-
release-detail/pfizer_announces_termination_of_proposed_combination_with_allergan 
[https://perma.cc/YUP4-B5XT]. 
 210. Complaint at 6, Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. I.R.S., No. 1:16-cv-
944 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2016). 
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B. Application of the Anti-Injunction Act 
By one estimate, Pfizer stood to avoid approximately $35 billion in 
U.S. taxes because of the inversion transaction with Allergan.
211
  Therefore, 
given the stakes, it would have been quite bold for the Pfizer’s board of 
directors to authorize the consummation of the transaction and then 
challenge the inevitable denial of the tax benefits by the I.R.S. in court.  
Unfortunately for Pfizer, the Anti-Injunction Act requires such boldness.  
Although a few judicially created exceptions to the application of the Act 
exist, these exceptions are narrowly tailored and do not appear applicable 
to Pfizer.  Moreover, it is unlikely that the creation of a new exception for 
rulemaking that is arbitrary and capricious under State Farm will have 
much practical significance.  The effect of the anti-inversion regulations on 
affected taxpayers is unusual—perhaps not sui generis, but close to it.  
These regulations have enormously deleterious tax consequences on 
transactions that, once consummated, are virtually impossible to undo.  
Consequently, the pay now, sue later paradigm imposed by the Anti-
Injunction Act is, for all practical purposes, a bar to taxpayer challenges.  
The courts should examine whether the existing exceptions they created 
should be tweaked to consider practical realities.  Further impetus for such 
an examination should come from Congress’s recent proclivity to use the 
tax code for purposes other than revenue, a purpose the Anti-Injunction Act 
singularly protects. 
The Court has carved out several exceptions to the application of the 
Anti-Injunction Act.  It has held that proceedings whose success would have 
the effect of increasing tax revenue are not barred by the Anti-Injunction 
Act.
212
  The Court has also acknowledged two narrow common law 
 
 211. See Lynnley Browning, Pfizer Seen Avoiding $35 Billion in Tax Via Allergan 
Merger, BLOOMBERG POLITICS, http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-02-
25/pfizer-seen-as-avoiding-35-billion-in-tax-via-allergan-merger [https://perma.cc/7JT7-
KBG5] (Feb. 25, 2016) (explaining that the inversion regulations were not the only tax blow 
to the proposed merger).  Proposed regulations were issued in April 2016 that were finalized 
in October 2016 that would hinder Pfizer’s ability to strip U.S. earnings through the use of 
intercompany debt).  See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1-4 (2016). 
 212. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 10302-03 (2015) (citing to two lower court decisions).  
This case involved another statute, the Tax Injunction Act, which has been interpreted 
similarly to the Anti-Injunction Act; see also E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 
1278, 1283-85 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that the statute does not apply when a suit seeks to 
increase taxes), rev’d, Simon v. E, Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (holding that 
the suit should have been dismissed for lack of standing under the Anti-Injunction Act).  This 
case involved a claim by several organizations promoting access to health care by the poor 
alleging that an I.R.S. ruling that two hospitals were tax exempt violated I.R.C. section 
501(c)(3).  The plaintiffs asserted that the ruling violated the statute because it did not 
condition the tax exemption closely enough to the hospitals’ charitable care for the indigent, 
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exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.  First, a pre-enforcement challenge 
will be countenanced if the government could not prevail under any 
circumstances and the taxpayer would suffer irreparable harm from 
enforcement action.  Mere allegations of unconstitutionality are insufficient 
to trigger the application of this exception, as the Court noted in Bailey v. 
George, the child labor tax case.
213
  Approximately a decade later, in Miller 
v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida, the petitioner challenged an 
excise tax that the government asserted was applicable to the sale of its 
products.
214
  The Court found that the government’s assertion was erroneous 
and, in light of previous court decisions, arbitrary and capricious.
215
  
According to the Court: 
[I]n cases where complainant shows that in addition to the 
illegality of an exaction in the guise of a tax there exists some 
special and extraordinary circumstances sufficient to bring the 
case within some acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence, a 
suit may be maintained to enjoin the collector. . . .  It has never 
held the rule to be absolute, but has repeatedly indicated that 
extraordinary and exceptional circumstances render its provisions 
inapplicable.
216
 
The Court enjoined the enforcement of the excise tax because there 
existed no legal possibility that the tax could have been validly assessed and 
the payment of the tax would have had severe negative repercussions for the 
taxpayer’s business.
217
 
Thirty years later, the Court significantly narrowed the application of 
this exception in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., a case 
involving the application of payroll taxes.
218
  The Court held that whether a 
challenged exaction would cause the ruination of the taxpayer’s business is 
not, by itself, grounds for equitable relief from the application of the Anti-
Injunction Act.
219
  The Court acknowledged the exception set forth in 
Standard Nut but stated that whether the government has any chance of 
 
that its members were denied medical care, and that the I.R.S.’s action encouraged such denial 
by the hospitals.  Id. at 30-33.  According to the Court, whether any encouragement caused 
by the tax exemption resulted in the alleged denial of medical service was purely speculative 
and it was plausible that the hospitals in question would forego the tax exemption and operate 
unfettered by the restrictions imposed by such exemption.  Id. at 42-44. 
 213. Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 19-20 (1922).  See also Dodge v. Osborne, 240 U.S. 
118, 121-122 (1915) (“[A] suit may not be brought to enjoin the assessment or collection of 
a tax because of the alleged unconstitutionality of the statute imposing it.”) 
 214. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida, 284 U.S. 498 (1932). 
 215. Id. at 509-510. 
 216. Id. (citations omitted). 
 217. Id. at 510-11. 
 218. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). 
 219. Id. at 6-7. 
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prevailing on the merits is to be determined on the basis of information 
available to the government at the time of suit and under the most liberal 
view of the law and the facts.
220
  In a later case, the Court characterized 
Williams Packing as the case that “switched the focus of the extraordinary 
and exceptional circumstances test from a showing of the degree of harm to 
the plaintiff absent an injunction to the requirement that it be established that 
the Service’s action is plainly without a legal basis.”
221
  The Court has made 
clear on several occasions that it is very difficult for taxpayers to show that 
the government has no chance of prevailing on the merits.
222
  Most recently, 
the Court held that a suit alleging that a tax on coal exports violated the 
Export Clause of the Constitution was barred because, at the time the tax was 
assessed, the scope of the Export Clause was unsettled.
223
 
Under the second common law exception, a pre-enforcement action is 
permitted if, under the circumstances, no other legal remedy is available. 
224
  
In Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, the Court permitted 
the University of Georgia and the Georgia School of Technology to 
challenge the constitutionality of a federal admissions tax imposed upon 
patrons of the schools’ football games for which the two schools were 
responsible to collect and remit to the federal government.
225
  The schools 
asserted that the admissions tax imposed an unconstitutional burden on an 
essential state function.
226
  Because the tax was imposed on patrons, the 
schools were unable to bring a suit for refund.  The Court stated that the 
statutory bar to tax challenges did not apply:  “[I]n exceptional cases where 
there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law.  This is such a case, 
for here the assessment is not of a tax payable by respondent but of a penalty 
for failure to collect it from another.”
227
 
 
 220. Id. at 7-8. 
 221. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 745 (1974). 
 222. See, e.g., id. at 737, 748-49 (stating that a determination of whether the government 
could prevail must be decided under the most liberal view of law and facts in favor of the 
government, and holding that the petitioner’s claims were sufficiently debatable to foreclose 
the possibility that the government could not prevail); Alexander v. Ams. United Inc., 416 
U.S. 752, 761-762 (1974). 
 223. United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 14 (2008).  This case 
involved the application of I.R.C. section 7422, a statute that precludes suits for refund if a 
claim for refund was not filed.  Id. The statute of limitations for filing refund claims had 
expired and the taxpayer sought a refund under a non-tax statute whose statute of limitations 
was considerably longer.  Id. at 4-6.  The Court believed that I.R.C. section 7422 was more 
restrictive than the Anti-Injunction Act, but went on to examine the taxpayer’s argument that 
Williams Packing did not bar its suit.  Id. at 13-14. 
 224. Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S. 439 (1938). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 448. 
 227. Id. at 449.  A refund claim was sought by the respondents and denied because the 
schools were mere collecting agents and had no interest in the funds collected if such funds 
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In 1984, the Court granted South Carolina leave to file a complaint 
against the Secretary of Treasury.
228
  The state sought to enjoin the Treasury 
from enforcing a recently enacted provision in the Internal Revenue Code 
that would deny a tax exemption to interest earned on the obligations of any 
state unless the obligations were issued in registered form.
229
  South Carolina 
asserted that the conditions imposed by the Internal Revenue Code provision 
at issue destroyed the state’s freedom to issue debt obligations in a form of 
her choosing and, thus, violated the Tenth Amendment.
230
  Moreover, the 
state asserted that the federal government may not tax interest earned on state 
obligations regardless of the form of such obligation.
231
  The state would be 
required to pay higher interest rates on taxable obligations than it would on 
tax exempt obligations. However, the state would be unable to challenge the 
statute’s legality in a suit for refund because any taxes at issue would have 
been imposed on the holders of the obligations.
232
 
The Court believed there was no need for it to determine whether the 
exception it set forth in Williams Packing was applicable because it held the 
Anti-Injunction Act “was not intended to bar an action where, as here, 
Congress has not provided the plaintiff with an alternative legal way to 
challenge the validity of a tax.”
233
  Despite the dearth of legislative history 
regarding the statute, the Court believed that the circumstances of its 
enactment suggested that Congress did not intent for it to apply unless an 
alternative legal avenue to contest the legality of a tax was available to an 
aggrieved party.
234
  The Court proceeded to dismiss the government’s 
argument that holders of the debt could challenge the legality of the provision 
in question because of the uncertainty of whether such a challenge would, or 
could, be mounted.
235
 
The D.C. Circuit, in the Z Street case previously discussed, held that the 
 
were, in fact, unlawfully collected.  Id. at 446.  The Court ruled in favor of the government 
on the merits.  See id. at 452-53 (reversing the Fifth Circuit’s decree in favor of plaintiff). 
 228. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 370 (1984). 
 229. Id. at 370-71. 
 230. Id. at 371-72. 
 231. Id. at 372. 
 232. Id. at 378-80. 
 233. Id. at 373. 
 234. Id. at 373-76.  In the Court’s opinion, the amendment to the statute to include third 
parties within its strictures was not relevant in this case.  Id. at 376-77; I.R.C. § 7421(a) 
(2012). 
 235. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. at 380-81.  I.R.C. section 7478 permits a state to 
seek a declaratory judgment from the Tax Court as to whether obligations a state desires to 
issue meet the requirements for tax exemption.  However, this provision does not permit an 
action challenging the constitutionality of a provision or provisions that set forth the standards 
for obligations to obtain tax exempt status.  See id. at 378 n.17 (noting that IRC section 7478 
does not provide a cause of action for contesting constitutionality as to section 103(j)(1)). 
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Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to a non-profit organization’s claim that 
the I.R.S. was delaying the processing of the organization’s application for 
tax exempt status because of the organization’s political positions.
236
  The 
court held that the action did not fall within the confines of the statute 
because the suit was not brought for the purpose of restraining the assessment 
or collection of any tax.
237
  However, the court also held that the Anti-
Injunction Act did not apply because its application would leave the 
organization with no remedy.
238
  Section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code 
does permit an organization to seek a declaratory judgment with respect to 
its qualification as a tax exempt organization if the I.R.S. has not acted on its 
application by a certain time.
239
  However, in this case, the organization was 
not seeking to establish its qualification as a tax exempt organization but 
rather to prevent the I.R.S, from unlawfully delaying its application.  
According to the court, to require an organization to wait the requisite time 
and then seek a declaratory action would free the I.R.S. to engage in 
viewpoint discrimination in its processing of applications for tax exempt 
status.
240
  If the organization’s action was barred, then it would have no legal 
means to challenge the I.R.S.’s procedures for processing its application.
241
 
Sebelius could have created another exception to the applicability of the 
Ant-Injunction Act.  The individual mandate at issue in that case did not 
become effective until 2014, more than a year after the Court rendered its 
decision.
242
  The I.R.S. was not yet enforcing the provision and, therefore, 
challenges to the validity of the provision at the time the issue was litigated 
did not impede the federal government’s assessment and collection of 
revenue.  Because the Court held that the mandate was not a tax for purposes 
of the Anti-Injunction Act, it had no need to consider whether challenges to 
a tax prior to its effective date are barred by the statute.
243
 
The exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act set forth in Williams Packing 
and Regan do not appear to apply to a pre-enforcement challenge to the 
 
 236. Z St. v. Koskinen, 791 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
 237. Id. at 32. 
 238. Id. at 31-32. 
 239. I.R.C. § 7428 (2012). 
 240. Z St., 791 F.3d at 31-32.  The organization could, in the event its application is denied, 
challenge any tax deficiency asserted against it or sue for refund of any disputed taxes it paid.  
Id. Similarly, the court held that these remedies offer no redress for unlawful processing of 
applications.  See id. at 31 (noting that remedies provided for in other provisions would do 
nothing to offer relief as to the alleged delay in processing the Z Street’s application). 
 241. Id. 
 242. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b); 
10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 244-49, 909-10 (2010) (codified as I.R.C. § 5000A (2012) 
(mandating individuals to maintain certain amounts of health insurance coverage beginning 
after 2013). 
 243. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 546 (2012). 
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regulations that derailed the Pfizer-Allergan combination.  As the Court 
made clear in a later case, Williams Packing requires the taxpayer to show 
that, with the facts and the law interpreted liberally in favor of the 
government, the government could not prevail on the merits under any 
circumstances.
244
  The anti-inversion regulations were issued pursuant to a 
broad statutory grant of authority.  Whether the regulations have gone too far 
in light of the statute is not obvious and the Treasury’s position is, at the very 
least, colorable.  The regulations may very well be a permissible 
interpretation of the statute under a deferential Chevron review.  The statute 
does not appear to preclude the Treasury from enacting a bright-line rule that 
takes account of multiple acquisitions that occur within a certain time frame 
for purposes of applying the statutory percentage thresholds.  Such a rule 
may very well be a reasonable use of the Treasury’s broad authority to issue 
regulations to prevent avoidance of the statute.
245
  As previously noted, the 
Court refused to grant a taxpayer relief to challenge an export tax that it knew 
was unconstitutional because, at the time the tax was assessed, the 
constitutional status of the tax was unsettled.
246
  Williams Packing is, indeed, 
a high hurdle to overcome and the exception’s utility appears limited to 
egregious regulatory overreach. 
As previously discussed, the State Farm doctrine is separate and 
distinct from Chevron and often its application does not go to the merits of 
an agency’s action but to the agency’s adherence to procedural 
requirements.  For example, a regulation that may very well pass muster 
under Chevron may not be supported by a reasoned explanation by the 
agency.  Alternatively, the agency may have failed to address comments in 
opposition of the regulation.  Arguably, an obvious failure to meet the 
strictures of State Farm would render the regulation invalid under any 
circumstances, whether those circumstances are viewed in a light most 
favorable to the agency.  However, even if one were to concede that 
procedural defects render the agency’s action invalid on its face, it is 
unlikely that a pre-enforcement would be countenanced and, if it were, 
such a challenge would offer little practical utility. 
If we assume that anti-inversion regulations were arbitrary and 
capricious under the State Farm standard and that the agency could not 
prevail, the exception set forth in Standard Nut still requires the taxpayer to 
show an extraordinary degree of harm that results from the agency action.
247
  
The Court in Williams Packing placed its focus on the merits of the 
government’s position but it did not eliminate the second prong of Standard 
 
 244. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737 (1974). 
 245. I.R.C. § 7874(g). 
 246. United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 14 (2008). 
 247. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932). 
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Nut, a showing of extraordinary harm.
248
  It is not clear whether the harm 
must rise to the ruinous level that existed in Williams Packing, but it probably 
has to be close to such level.  It is unlikely that Pfizer could show such a 
degree of harm to its business.  Without question, the anti-inversion 
regulations negatively altered the economics of the contemplated 
transaction.  However, had Pfizer consummated the transaction, it is not at 
all clear that subsequent steps could not be taken to leave Pfizer in a tax 
position not all that far from where it would have been had it acquired 
Allergan in a more conventional acquisitive transaction.  Moreover, it is 
inconceivable that an enterprise of the size of Pfizer can encounter an 
extraordinarily devastating blow from a tax regulation that diminishes the 
profitability of its operations by subjecting it to taxes that it had been subject 
to prior to the transaction in question. 
In addition, a State Farm challenge that does not get to the merits of the 
government’s position is, for practical purposes, of little utility.  As the 
concurrence noted in Dominion Resources, regulations that fail on 
procedural grounds may very well have merit on substantive grounds.
249
  
Procedural defects can be remedied by an agency and the rule in question 
reissued.  As previously noted, Treasury regulations may be issued with 
retroactive effect in certain circumstances.
250
  Among those circumstances 
are regulations issued to correct procedural defects in previously issued 
regulations.
251
  A company in Pfizer’s position needs an answer on the merits 
and, as noted above, whether the Treasury’s position has legal merit is not 
obvious. 
The exception to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act that the 
Court applied in Allen and Regan is also unlikely to apply to a pre-
enforcement challenge to the anti-inversion regulations.  Both cases 
involved a challenge to a tax that was imposed on third parties but whose 
effect impacted the operations of the challengers.
252
  The two universities 
and the State of South Carolina objecting to the tax provisions in question 
were not the taxpayers and, therefore, could not pay now and sue later.  As 
 
 248. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., Inc., 370 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1962). 
 249. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(Clevenger, J., concurring). 
 250. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 7805(b)(1)(C), 7805(b)(2) (enabling tax regulations to have retroactive 
effect in certain circumstances). 
 251. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(4) (“[T]he Secretary may provide that any regulation may apply 
retroactively to correct a procedural defect in the issuance of any prior regulation.”)  
Moreover, Treasury regulations can be effective on the date on which any notice substantially 
describing the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final regulation is issued to 
the public.  I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(C) (2012). 
 252. Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S. 439 (1938); South Carolina v. 
Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984). 
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consequence, the Court held the Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable in 
situations in which Congress provided no alternative means for a 
challenge.
253
  Pfizer and other companies in a similar position do have an 
alternative remedy available.  Pfizer could have completed its transaction 
with Allergan and then challenged the inevitable denial of tax benefits in a 
suit for refund. 
The anti-inversion regulations should cause the courts to consider 
whether the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act should be expanded.  
Specifically, the exception set forth in Allen and Regan should be 
applicable if there is no practical alternative legal remedy to a pre-
enforcement challenge available to taxpayers.  The circumstances in which 
such an expanded exception would apply would be rare but it would apply 
in Pfizer’s case.  Although Pfizer could have consummated its transaction 
with Allergan and then litigated the validity of the regulations, as a 
practical matter, Pfizer was left with no remedy.  It is inconceivable that 
Pfizer’s board of directors would approve the transaction in question on the 
belief that the company would prevail in litigation against the Treasury.  
The regulations in question are atypical from most tax regulations and, as 
such, warrant a practical, nuanced, and more equitable view of the scope of 
the Anti-Injunction Act. 
The effects of the anti-inversion regulations are unique due to a 
combination of attributes.  First, the anti-inversion regulations apply to 
transactions whose effects are, for all intents and purposes, long-lived.  
Once done, extrication from their effects is difficult for the parties 
involved.  Second, such transactions are, by their nature, transformative in 
nature with significant financial effects on the parties.  As a result, a 
taxpayer is unable to float a trial balloon as a test case to litigate the merits 
of the regulations.  Third, these transactions are voluntary.  No one is 
compelled, legally or practically, to undertake an inversion transaction.  
Many tax rules share some, but not all, of these properties. 
For example, a tax regulation often has significant financial 
consequences on an ongoing operation.  To that extent, the transactions it 
impacts are not voluntary in the sense that the affected transactions will 
take place with or without the rule in question.  A post-assessment 
challenge is an adequate response to government overreach in such 
situations.  Many tax regulations will pose barriers to one-off transactions 
that are rendered uneconomical by the rules imposed by the regulations in 
question.  Tax rules may be issued that hinder transactions that are 
contemplated as part of a family’s wealth management strategy, force the 
restructuring of an asset acquisition, or alter the terms of a large lawsuit 
 
 253. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S. at 449; Regan, 465 U.S. at 373. 
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settlement, for example.  However, in such cases, taxpayers who do not 
want to abandon their plans can usually challenge the rules by 
consummating a transaction on a small scale as a test case.  Moreover, in 
such cases, the tax effects are isolated to a particular transaction and the 
decision to proceed notwithstanding the tax uncertainty may very well be a 
reasonable decision. 
In some measure, the inability to challenge the anti-inversion rules is 
analogous to the cases in which not-for-profit entities, such as Bob Jones 
University, were unable to challenge their denial of tax exempt status prior 
to the assessment of tax.  As a technical matter, such organizations had a 
remedy—a post-assessment suit for refund.  Practically, this remedy 
offered little relief from the effects that the denial of tax exempt status had 
on the ability of such organization to raise funds from donors who, 
understandably, wanted assurance that their donations were tax 
deductible.
254
  Congress acted to remedy this problem by allowing pre-
assessment reviews with respect to an organization’s tax-exempt status.
255
  
It is unlikely that Congress would enact legislation designed to encourage 
inversions. 
Ironically, the Court did not adhere to a rigid application of rules but 
showed a willingness to examine the particular facts and circumstances in 
the very case that it refused to apply the Anti-Injunction Act:  Sebelius.
256
  
The Court ruled against the government on two issues in that case.
257
  First, 
it held that the individual health insurance mandate was beyond Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce.
258
  Second, it held that the expansion 
of Medicaid under the statute impermissibly compelled the states to enact or 
administer a federal program.
259
  The Court had long recognized that the 
federal government may induce states, through the spending power, to enact 
or administer programs.
260
  However, permissible financial inducements 
become impermissible coercion when a state is left with no practical choice 
but to comply—when “pressure turns into compulsion.”
261
  In this case, a 
state that refused to expand its Medicaid program faced a loss of all federal 
 
 254. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 738 (1974). 
 255. I.R.C. § 7428 (2012).  This exception was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and 
has mitigated the hardship that the preclusion of a pre-enforcement remedy imposed upon tax 
exempt organizations.  Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1306, 90 Stat. 1520, 
1717 (1976). 
 256. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 587.  The Court upheld the mandate under Congress’s taxing power.  Id. at 
570. 
 259. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 585. 
 260. Id. at 576. 
 261. Id. at 577 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 201 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Medicaid funding.
262
  In theory, a state had the option to refuse and lose a 
great deal of federal funding.  Practically, given the amount of money at 
stake, a state had no choice. 
Taxpayer standing rules prevent taxpayers from challenging 
unwarranted government largess doled out as favors to specific industries 
or as a means to achieve non-tax policy goals.
263
  The fact that the political 
process can rectify agency overreach in such cases is of little comfort to 
taxpayers who value fiscal responsibility or the rule of law.
264
  However, 
the standing rules preclude a legal remedy for harms that are diffuse and 
common to all taxpayers.  At a visceral level, there is something more 
sinister in the inability to challenge a rule that directly harms a particular 
taxpayer.  Agency action that forces a taxpayer to abandon a transaction 
without the ability to challenge the merits of the agency’s action is an 
invitation to agency overreach and usurps the separation of powers. 
CONCLUSION 
Over eighty years ago the Court opined that “taxes are the lifeblood of 
government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious 
need.”
265
  To that end, the courts have been reluctant to expand taxpayers’ 
ability to impede I.R.S. assessment and collection efforts.  In light of the 
increasing use of the tax code to accomplish objectives unrelated to 
government funding, perhaps the courts should be less reticent to examine 
the equities of a particular case when encountered by the Anti-Injunction 
Act.  The tax system has never served solely as a socially neutral revenue 
machine, but Professor Kristin Hickman, in a recent study, has shown that 
the tax system has been enlisted to serve policy goals unrelated to revenue 
to an increasing degree in recent decades.
266
  Professor Hickman’s study 
cast some doubt on the notion of tax exceptionalism as a reason for the 
 
 262. Id. at 581. 
 263. A taxpayer must show the sustainment of some direct injury and not merely some 
indefinite injury she shares with people generally.  Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 
(1923).  The assertion of harm based on the effect of a tax policy on federal revenues or 
expenditures is “too remote, fluctuating, and uncertain” and a taxpayer’s “interest in moneys 
of the Treasury” is “shared with millions of others.”  Id. at 487. 
 264. See Melone, supra note 78 (discussing Notice 2008-83 which provided favorable 
treatment to banks to assist healthy banks acquire struggling banks during the 2008 financial 
crisis and the resultant congressional response). 
 265. Bull v. U.S., 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935). 
 266. Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 Duke L. J. 1717 
(2014).  See also Linda Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court has 
Reduced Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 777 
(2013) (discussing how recent Court decisions have removed barriers to the use of the tax 
code to achieve policy goals).  
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Treasury excusing itself from the general strictures of administrative law.  
The use of the tax code to serve social policy goals does not diminish the 
government’s “imperious need” to raise revenue promptly.  However, such 
use of the tax system should cause the courts to question the inviolability of 
the Anti-Injunction Act despite the equities of a particular case.  
Admittedly, a multi-national corporation, particularly one seeking to move 
its domicile out of the United States for tax purposes, does not make for the 
most sympathetic party to argue the inequity of a statute.  Nonetheless, 
such a party is more sympathetic than a federal government agency whose 
rulemaking is, for all practical purposes, beyond review. 
